

RURAL RESILIENCE PROJECT REPORT 2023 (EN)

January 2024

ARC 2020 – “RURAL RESILIENCE” PROJECT - PHASE 2 – 2023 REPORT



Missions of the European Rural and Agricultural Convention (ARC 2020):

- Promote, mobilise and network with initiatives, associations and NGOs
- Facilitate the participation of local players in consultations and dialogue at European level
- **Carry out policy analysis and reflection on agriculture, food and developments in the European countryside**
- **Help to attune these policies to the needs of people and the environment**

The Rural Resilience project, carried out within the scope of these mission has been funded since late2020 by:



*The editorial bias of this document is to bring together the five **multi-tiered agri-rural policy analyses published in 2023 on the arc2020.eu website**. Without reproducing these analyses in extenso, this document aims to provide a more complete and holistic vision of the 2023 year's main theme: **looking at Germany from a French perspective, to identify useful proposals** for the ecosystem of players (associations or elected representatives) working to build public policies that are more respectful of environment and social justice.*

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Writing / Coordination: Dr Marie-Lise Breure-Montagne, Rural Resilience project coordinator, ARC 2020.

French / English translation of the five analyses: Louise Kelleher & Ashley Parsons

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CONTENTS

- **EDITORIAL** p. 5
 - **Fig. 1: Policy analyses for phase 2 of the project (2023)** - drawn from common themes in Phase 1 of the project
 - **Fig. 2: Three main stages of a resilience process** (to map the analysis themes chosen for the RURAL RESILIENCE 2023 project)

- **INTRODUCTION: Background on France and Germany** p. 9
 - (1). Overview of the agricultural sector in France and Germany
 - (2). Some comments on rural areas (*zones rurales / ländlicher Raum*)
 - (3). Multi-tiered agri-rural policies: from the impetus (from Brussels) to the local level (and/or vice versa)

- **[ANALYSIS 1: Democratising food policy](#)** p. 19

FOCUS A: MULTI-TIERED SOCIAL POLICIES TOWARDS QUALITY FOOD FOR ALL [Summary of events] p. 25
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- **[ANALYSIS 2: Well-being and rurality: moving away from pesticides](#)** p. 31

- **[ANALYSIS 3: Access to land](#)** p. 39

- **[ANALYSIS 4: Water as a common good; climate risks, a common destiny](#)** p. 45

FOCUS B: EUTROPHICATION OF FRESH AND COASTAL WATERS [Strategic briefing, on a common point between French and German agriculture] p. 51

- **[ANALYSIS 5: Regional nature parks: Islands of resilience](#)** p. 57

- **SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS: "System change, for living rural areas" ... three key words that cut across the five analyses.** p. 65
 - *"MASSIFICATION" of the agroecological transition*
 - *"SUBSIDIARITY" between levels of territorial administration*
 - *Individual and collective mobilisation: in "TERRITORIES (OF SURVIVAL)"*

- **APPENDICES:** p. 75
 - **[Appendix 1:](#)** Collective Intelligence work process, including:
 - Bibliography / webography
 - **[Appendix 2:](#)** Displaying major rural trends in Europe (as a way to assess itinere the choice of the themes for the Rural Resilience Project 2023)
 - **[Appendix 3:](#)** Main policies and funds in European Union




2023: Sixty years after the **Elysée Treaty**, a key moment to bring France and Germany closer together

On January 22nd, 1963, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and French President Charles De Gaulle signed the Élysée Treaty. This agreement marked the reconciliation of the two countries, less than two decades after the Second World War, and strengthened **Franco-German relations for these two major players in the construction of Europe.**

Sixty years later, within the ARC 2020 association dedicated to the Europe of rural and agricultural areas, it seemed appropriate to bring these two countries together again, in a European context where rural resilience is increasingly becoming a unifying compass.

Rural areas (and the people who keep them alive): the centre of gravity of the Rural Resilience project.

Common issues in phase 1 of the Rural Resilience project	Policy analyses for phase 2 (2023):
 <p>LAND WATER SOIL</p> <p>SUCCESSION EXPERIMENTS QUALITY OF LIFE</p> <p>NETWORKS DYNAMICS FOOD</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to agricultural land - Water, a common good... climate risks, a collective destiny - Well-being in rural areas: Moving away from pesticides - Regional Nature Parks (+National Parks): islands of rural resilience - Democratising food policies (PAT in France / Food Council Policy in Germany)

While the first phase of the Rural Resilience project identified **themes common to French rural and farming communities (fig. 1)**, phase 2 (2023-2024) involves delving deeper into these matters, with increasingly acute awareness of issues such as **adaptation to climate change and territorial inequalities**.

[Local, regional and/or national partners](#) continue to be mobilised to ensure that the project remains firmly rooted in the local ground. Building on phase 1, we visited **new territories** (among the poorest: Hauts-de-France, Cévennes, Auvergne) to refine the questions and proposals, subject by subject.

Looking to our German neighbours remains an inexhaustible source of questions, so choices had to be made.

Multi-tiered rural policies: a plunge into the administrative and political complexity of this decade's strategic challenges

ARC 2020 has identified five areas of public policy where there is a strong **need for coherence between levels of administration** (from European to local) ... often as a corollary of the shared competences between the EU and the Member States. This complexity is combined with the competences shared within each State: the so-called "*territorial millefeuille*".

The choice and treatment of these five topics (see table above) are based on other contextual factors:

- Subjects that are likely to be of concern to every European citizen (such as the **right to local, healthy and accessible food** and the territorial approaches to make it a reality: see [analysis 1 and focus A](#)).
- Differences between France and Germany that are significant and inspiring for the rest of Europe (e.g. rates of crop insurance coverage: [analysis 4](#)), or conversely, key common points:
 - The two biggest consumers of pesticides in the EU ([analysis 2](#)),
 - The two countries that have the right of pre-emption in their national regulations ([analysis 3](#)).
- Last but not least, issues on the European parliamentary agenda for 2023: **Sustainable Food System law** (finally postponed), **SUR regulation**

(finally rejected), **Nature Restoration Law**, etc., or high-profile proposals such as **Via Campesina's Land Directive**.

Focus on Germany: France's false twin

After Brexit, France and Germany, both members of the G8, became two heavyweights in the construction of Europe, grappling with yet another **mid-life crisis: how to translate the Green Deal into acceptable regulations?** These two major countries alone represent a third of the population of the European Union (83 million Germans and 68 million French). Within these two profoundly different countries, one more rural (France), the other more urban and denser (Germany), the culture of political and public action is rooted in a specific territorial network, one run by centralising hands (France), the other characterised by federalism (Germany of the Länders). Some observers believe that since 2012 we have experienced a "winter" of Franco-German relations, immobilised by economic and financial issues (including very different approaches to public deficits). What's more, the Germans see themselves as "the winners of globalisation". These sweeping generalities **fail to address the issues of agriculture, rurality and transition**.

Comparing the two, on these judiciously chosen subjects, brings home the complexity of the work still to be done if Europe is to become the largest region area on the planet to succeed in its agroecological transition (an intention bandied about in Brussels).

By publishing this annual Rural Resilience report (Phase 2 – 2023) in two EU languages (French and English), ARC 2020 is also helping to educate people about how Europe works (an ambition that has never been achieved, given the EU's abundance of complexities), and about the (difficult but essential) links between European, national, regional and local policies.

The five prescriptive analyses are complemented by two focus areas to achieve our aim of best informing Europe's citizens, in line with their everyday life concerns and their values of civic involvement.

Finally, the intermediate conclusion for 2023 summarises the most transversal proposals, despite the specific nature of each of the subjects covered and of each of these two countries. Three key words stood out in the run-up to the

European elections: **massification** (of the agroecological transition), **subsidiarity** between levels of administration, and **territories (of survival)** – the key players in rural resilience.

Happy reading!

Figure 2: The three main stages of a resilience process: mapping the analysis themes chosen for the Rural Resilience project in 2023

“System change to support a living countryside” = Project goal	Rural resilience through <u>planning</u>	<u>Crisis management</u> as a key moment in rural resilience	“ <u>Build back better</u> ” – towards rural resilience... or giving up
<i>Democratising food policy</i>			
<i>Move away from Pesticides</i>			
<i>Access to land</i>			
<i>Water as a common good</i>			
<i>Islands of resilience</i>			

Source: our work, based on the **definition of resilience of the CAWR-Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience, University of Coventry** (resilience as a collective learning process)



INTRODUCTION

Background on France and Germany

As the story of the CAP was about to begin, France was considered to be superior to Germany: "*While production per cultivated hectare is almost twice as high in Germany as in France, France exceeds Germany by around 40% in terms of value added per active person*" (1958¹). German agriculture, mainly on the plains, was already more intensive (yield per hectare) than French agriculture, which was also conducted in its many **mountainous areas**.

Since then, France and Germany have emulated each other peacefully in numerous areas: in a study by the French government entitled "France-Germany: comparative performances" (2014²), neither agriculture nor local authorities were considered as important areas for study: not a word on these two major subjects! Worthy of note, a decade ago one of France's few strengths was the fight against inequality³ (see [focus A](#)).

Phase 2 of the Rural Resilience project (2023 - 2024) aims for "**system change to support a living countryside, based on [social and environmental] values**":

- This objective prompts us to examine not only the relationships between the EU and Member States (to improve the implementation of various policies), but also the relationships between farmers, their key stakeholders (e.g. the insurance sector, one of the actors in rural resilience: see [analysis 4](#)) and local authorities acting under Pillar II of the CAP or any other related topic (shaping life or survival in rural areas).

¹ [L'agriculture et le marché commun. Quelques éléments de la comparaison France-Allemagne - Persée \(persee.fr\)](#) (1958).

² [France - Allemagne : performances comparées | France Stratégie \(strategie.gouv.fr\)](#)

³ "In some areas, France is certainly in a better position, for example in terms of demographics, infrastructure and the fight against inequality."

1. Overview of the agricultural sector in France and Germany

A few figures provide a snapshot of the agricultural sector in each country and suggest that they are comparable (because they are not too different):

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR	FRANCE	GERMANY ⁴
Number and size of farms	416 400 (2020) ⁵ 69 ha (+ 25% in 10 years)	263 500 (2020) 63 ha (+13% in 10 years)
Workforce in agriculture	660 000 FTE (2020)	936 900 people working in agriculture
% Agriculture in GHG emissions	19% <i>(source: SOLAGRO)</i>	14%
% Organic farming	<p>↳ 2. Part des surfaces cultivées en agriculture biologique en 2019</p> <p>12% of farms in 2020 (up 8 points on 2010)</p>	<p>Part de la SAU (surface agricole utile) bio en 2016</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ de 31 à 52 % ■ de 21 à 30 % ■ de 11 à 20 % ■ de 7 à 10 % ■ de 5 à 6 % ■ de 3 à 4 % ■ de 0 à 2 % <p>10% of farms in 2020</p>

The agro-economist Vincent Chatellier, a researcher at the Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRAE), explained some ten years ago: "Averages hide huge disparities [...]; while French agriculture is strongly structured by the differences between **plains and mountains**, Germany is more divided into two parts: **East and West**⁶."

⁴ [263 500 exploitations agricoles en Allemagne \(socopag.com\)](https://www.socopag.com/)

⁵ [VizAgreste : le recensement agricole 2020 en dataviz \(agriculture.gouv.fr\)](https://dataviz.agriculture.gouv.fr/)


[Les chiffres définitifs et détaillés du Recensement agricole 2020 | Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Souveraineté alimentaire](https://www.agriculture.gouv.fr/la-communication/actualites/les-chiffres-definitifs-et-detailles-du-recensement-agricole-2020)

⁶ [Agricultures française et allemande : le point sur les chiffres – EURACTIV.fr \(2011\)](https://euractiv.fr/fr/agriculture-francaise-et-allemande-le-point-sur-les-chiffres)

Farming, and more broadly French rural life, cannot be understood without a **geographical (and therefore climatic...) perspective**, whereas the events taking place in Germany are influenced by **post-war history**.

This division of the territory on either side of the Rhine therefore goes beyond the agricultural sector in the strict sense of the term, and can also be seen in the zoning of the European Structural Funds (ERDF/ESF)⁷:

Eligibility of regions for the Structural Funds (ERDF, ESF) for 2014 - 2020



⁷ One of the main instruments of the Union's cohesion policy. Its aim is to help reduce disparities between the levels of development of Europe's regions and improve living conditions in the least favoured regions. ([Fonds européen de développement régional \(FEDER\) | Fiches thématiques sur l'Union européenne | Parlement européen \(europa.eu\)](#))

2. Some comments on rural areas (“zones rurales” / “ländlicher Raum”)


Rural space is a term with operational value: to support spatial planning policy, economic policy, and any action aimed at preserving and improving life in the countryside.

By extending the scope of the Rural Resilience project from France to Germany, another fundamental issue, to begin with, is the [definition of rural space](#).

In France, with a new definition (from 2020), rural areas accounted for **88% of French “communes” and 33% of the population in 2017** (in Europe in 2013: 57% of the territory & 24% of the population, according to **an OECD definition based on density: fewer than 150 inhabitants/km²**).

*"Until 2020, INSEE defined rural areas as all communes that do not belong to an urban unit that is characterised by a grouping of more than 2,000 inhabitants in an area with a certain continuity of built-up areas, which is supposed to characterise "towns". **The definition proposed here breaks with this town-centred approach. Rural areas are now defined as all communes with low or very low population densities**"⁸.*


Rural (green) and urban (red) categories in France (source: INSEE, 2017)



⁸ [Une nouvelle définition du rural pour mieux rendre compte des réalités des territoires et de leurs transformations – La France et ses territoires | Insee](#)

In Germany: "German municipalities are divided into five categories according to their size. All those with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants are "rural villages" and those with between 2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants are called "rural towns" (Landstadt). The definition of rural is progressive, qualitative rather than quantitative, and avoids any reductionist reference to agricultural activity alone"⁹.

Patchwork of rural [green], urban [brown] and densely urban [red] areas



Conception et réalisation : Guillaume Lacquement


⁹ [Réinventer les campagnes en Allemagne - La définition de l'espace rural dans le cadre des politiques d'aménagement du territoire en Allemagne - ENS Éditions \(openedition.org\)](https://www.openedition.org/)

The maps of rural areas in the two countries are similar in terms of the **nuances of rurality** and show the interdependence between rural and urban areas. 'Around 5,000 inhabitants' is a threshold for characterising rurality at municipal level on both sides of the Rhine.

3. Multi-tiered agri-rural policies: from the impetus (from Brussels) to the local level (and/or vice versa)

Any professional involved in local (and/or rural) policy in France has been confronted, at least once in their life, with a comparison with Germany:

German institutions at national, Lander and local level



Source : [File:Administrative divisions of Germany.svg - Wikipedia](#)

The last decade in France has seen a major reform of the French territorial "millefeuille": the MAPTAM (2014) and NOTRe (2015) laws. The aim was to reduce the number of French regions (the approximate equivalent of the Landers in Germany), strengthen their roles and competences (around economic development and regional planning), and increase the power of the inter-municipal (*intercommunal*) level: groupings of villages in rural areas (*communautés de communes*), cities and surroundings (*communautés*

d'agglomérations) or conurbations (*métropoles*), depending on population density. In this way, the region and intercommunalities (*métropoles*) would become the new tandem, to halt the decline in international competition. This reform is intended to be consistent with Europe: it comes a year after the regions became managing authorities for the LEADER European programmes under pillar II of the CAP.

Once again, the comparison did not seem to favour France:

"The first [certainty on the French side] was to think that Germany had succeeded in territorial reform in the 1970s, with all the differences that, in a country with a federal structure, could not fail to be noted from one Land to another, while France, despite having the powers of a centralised state, was still unable to do so"¹⁰.

CRITERIA	FRANCE	GERMANY
TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION: fewer rural municipalities in Germany!		
Number of inhabitants (per municipality)	1 760 (2014)	6 620 (2014)
Number of municipalities	36 700 (2014) 34 955 (1/01/22)	12 244 (2014)
Size of country (km ²)	551 000 km ² (excluding Overseas Departments and Territories)	357 000 km ²
Number of inhabitants	68 million (1/1/23)	83.8 million

Despite the differences in these figures (Germany has a larger population and is denser, but has three times fewer communes than France), the specialists are clear: "The French territorial *millefeuille* is matched by a German territorial *millefeuille* which has little to envy the former in terms of the overlapping of powers. The number of municipalities did not in itself mean very much and... it

¹⁰ [Introduction. De la difficulté des réformes territoriales en France et en Allemagne | Cairn.info](#)

was necessary to look more closely at the development of inter-municipalities to understand that France had undergone and was continuing to undergo a profound transformation of the municipal network through the development of intercommunalities" (11).

Rural, sparsely populated or very sparsely populated community (outside the urban area)



Mézères town hall (Haute-Loire), with local building materials (FR)



Marburg Town Hall (Hessen) (DE) : the municipality is located in a high-density Kreis, in an urbanised area (but surrounded by rural Kreis)

In France, "the commune [rural municipality] is the basic level of the Republic: that of local democracy", and it "remains the only level of local government to have the general competence clause that will enable it to respond to all the day-to-day needs of citizens". Provided, of course, that they have the resources to implement these local policies: for European subsidies, it is the supra-municipal levels that remain the most operational and recognised in rural areas.

During phase 2 of the Rural Resilience project, we take a closer look at intercommunalities and their initiatives (such as the **Territorial Food Programmes [PAT]**, [analysis 1](#), which is better suited to supra-municipal levels), and other territories of the project bringing together several intercommunalities (the areas now known as PETER: Pôle d'Equilibre Territorial et Rural, and the Regional Nature Parks, see [analysis 5](#)) to illustrate this profound transformation of the network of *communes* by the development of intermunicipal bodies.

The big difference between France and Germany is that the Länder have large budgets at their disposal to carry out their mandate, which certainly change from one period to the next, but are guaranteed by law and not negotiated on an ad hoc basis under the State-Region plans (which, in France, can provide the additional financial resources required to apply for LEADER programmes). In France, local authorities are, in a way, supervised by the government through the extremely complex system of French local tax system¹¹.

Another essential aspect specific to Germany is the principle of equalisation of costs between the Federal State and the Länders, on the one hand, and between the Länders (Länderfinanzausgleich) on the other, under which the richest Länders, i.e. those with the highest tax resources, help the poorest Länders. This national tax system was also modified in 2020, becoming more complex and linked to VAT (previously, the equalisation of costs between Länders essentially relied on three contributors: Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse, while the 13 other Länders were beneficiaries).

Without going into all **funding issues** in detail, some of the subjects covered will help to address this key point ([analysis 1](#), [analysis 2](#) & [analysis 4](#)) - which sometimes explains the major discrepancy between the initial intention of European or national legislators and the measured results and impact of public policies.

¹¹ Macron's abolition of the *taxe d'habitation* (council tax), one of the main measures he took in his first term of office, was not that helpful for local authorities.



Bridge damaged after an extreme weather event ... not repaired 3 years later (Saint-Etienne Vallée Française, Cévennes mountains)

	<p>POLICY ANALYSIS 1: Democratising Food Policy: Territorial Food Programmes & Food Policy Councils</p>
<p>Publication date on www.ARC2020.eu :</p> <p>July 2023</p> <p><i>(Input for ARC 2020's annual rural gathering in Hesse, Germany, Nov. 23)</i></p>	<p>France Democratising Food Policy - Tweaking The Financial Toolbox Agricultural and Rural Convention (arc2020.eu) (part 1)</p> <p>Ernährungsrat: The democratic potential of Food Policy Councils in Germany Agricultural and Rural Convention (arc2020.eu) (part 2)</p>
<p><u>FOCUS A:</u> MULTI-TIERED SOCIAL POLICIES TOWARDS QUALITY FOOD FOR ALL</p>	



Vegetarian dish at the political gathering of the Alliance des Tables Libres et Vivantes (Alliance of Free and Vibrant Tables), Sept 16 2023 (FR)



Chestnut soup and wholemeal bread, Gartenlaube Restaurant in Marburg (DE)

State of play in each of the two countries:

FRANCE	GERMANY (*)
<p>Third largest exporter in the world in 2005, France is now one of the world's top five exporters of agricultural products</p>	<p>Germany is the world's third largest agricultural exporter. German agriculture exports around a third of its production</p>
<p>A French farmer fed an average of 60 people <i>(source: French Senate report 2008) ... already in 1958, yield per hectare was half that of Germany).</i></p>	<p>One farmer in Germany can feed 142 people</p>
<p>In vegetables, France has been relegated to 4th position in the EU (Spain, now European leader ahead of Italy) (same for fruit: 4th position).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 28% of vegetables consumed are imported, and 71% of fruits. <p><i>(Source : Agriculture française : une puissance mondiale qui décline vie-publique.fr)</i></p> 	<p>German agriculture covers only a 3rd of German vegetable requirements and only a 5th of fruit requirements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 60% of vegetables and 80% of fruits are imported.  <p>Only potato production exceeds requirements.</p>
<p>47% of French adults are overweight and 17% of adults suffer from obesity. <i>Socio-economic inequalities in relation to obesity.</i> <i>(source : Comprendre le surpoids et l'obésité de l'adulte ameli.fr Assuré)</i></p>	<p>Germany has an incidence of overweight and obese adults of 54.8% as a percentage of the total population. <i>Germany ranked as the country with the highest proportion of overweight children in Europe (2007)</i></p>

(*) : [L'agriculture en Allemagne : dix faits \(deutschland.de\)](#)

Summary of the article (in 2 parts) published on www.arc2020.eu:

The **Green Deal** and **Farm to Fork Strategy** may not be on the radar for many French people, but 2020 shone a historic spotlight on local food supplies with COVID 19 lockdowns and food shortages. Yet numerous French municipalities and other local actors had been working towards this slow (r)evolution all along, in some cases for more than a decade.

The compartmentalised approach to food and agricultural issues leads to real policy gaps; one of the most obvious gaps is the [thorny issue of financing](#).

The rise of the Territorial Food Programmes (PAT - *Projets Alimentaires Territoriaux*), the French iteration of the Food Policy Councils in German-speaking countries, seems to be part of a very significant institutional context. Nevertheless, too few funding lines are available to anchor structuring projects in a critical mass of territories. However, while the money available still seems to fall (well) short of the stated ambitions, the mobilisation of citizens and inventiveness can compensate for this handicap, as illustrated by the approaches in Germany (with the Do It Yourself principles and the idea of starting with what is feasible). In Germany, it works with a constellation of local food democracies, where civil society, including environmental associations, is at the forefront.

France's Territorial Food Programmes (PAT) are **a confrontation of the horizontal and the vertical**. In the more innovative territories, the approach is more horizontal, and new urban-rural relationships are taking shape. [These territorial innovations](#) may be of interest to Germany, a more densely populated country than France. Yet the vertical remains ever present, since European funds (LEADER programmes, INTER-REG) are a major contributor to the most significant initiatives: projects to develop a PAT or PAIT (Inter-Territorial Food Programmes (*Projets Alimentaires Inter-Territoriaux*) for large populations.

<i>MULTI-TIERED RURAL POLICIES</i>	Summary of multi-tiered policies mentioned in analysis 1:
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EU: Sustainable Food Systems Law (planned in the "Farm to Fork" strategy and expected by the end of 2023: *in fine, withdrawn from the European agenda sine die*)

National (FR): future "SNANC" (National strategy for food, nutrition and climate: expected for Jan. 2024)	National (DE): New national food strategy: announced for 2025
Regions: managing authorities for European LEADER funding	Länders: managing authorities for European LEADER funding
Sub-regional: PAT (Territorial Food Programmes)	Local government: Food Council Policy (Ernährungsrat)

<i>SCREENING OF SOLUTIONS</i>	Summary of possible solutions (analysis 1):
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- **The case of the departmental vegetable processing plants (FR): the emblematic project of PATs in rural areas, with various lines of funding**
 - o A more demanding approach for local authorities: set up their own vegetable farm (e.g. Mouans Sartoux), to obtain organic AND local produce

- See **FOCUS A** below: **MULTI-TIERED SOCIAL POLICIES TOWARDS QUALITY FOOD FOR ALL**
 - o Faced with a food aid model in crisis: experiments that are flourishing (in rural France).
 - o Advocacy at supra-national level on the right to food (e.g. FIAN): an alternative to SFS Law? (withdrawn *sine die* from the European agenda)

There is a **dizzying array of funding sources** (for such local vegetable processing plants), to which only experienced players or those with critical mass can aspire: the Ministry of Agriculture and its decentralised departments (DRAAF), other budgets (such as the Pacte Ardennes stimulus package), departmental self-financing, ADEME (gov agency), and potentially ESF+ and INTER-REG. And, of course, the Regions, as the managing authority for LEADER programmes (unless the Regional Council decides otherwise, for the new 2023-2027 programming period). Finally, the Fonds France Relance recovery package, co-financed by the EU, a golden opportunity to ride on the heightened awareness –in the wake of COVID – of the vulnerability of our food systems.

If we assume that **such facilities (small & local vegetable processing plants)** are desirable for much more regions / territories, a simple calculation “from a corner of the table” shows that there is not enough money to scale up such solutions. This ["vegetable processing" example](#) helps us to understand the [EEB's recommendation](#) to make “**CAP as a daughter law of SFS law**”. **In fact, we are hardly surprised that the SFS law has been withdrawn** (because, as it stands, this new European policy would be unfunded in its implementation). A minority of MEPs are prepared to reverse the logic in this way: **the CAP in the service of the reterritorialisation of food**, less GHG-emitting, more vegetal-based, healthier, more diverse, and therefore more resilient in the face of climatic hazards and disruptions to supplies of inputs such as oilcake or nitrates. **The biggest war chest – pillar 1 of the CAP – will also have to be put to work in the name of re-localising food systems “faster, higher and stronger”.** **Without neglecting pillar 2 of the CAP.** Nor should we neglect the all-out mobilisation against food waste, aided by the objectives of the EU's circular economy: if properly implemented, this is one of the **main sources of self-financing for Territorial Food Programmes in general, and for projects such as vegetable processing plants.** The switch to organic farming, when the extra cost is

compensated for by a ration with less meat, is another lever for self-financing (as meat represents half the price of a meal).

A final paradox, and a major subject of controversy on the long road to resilient food chains: Europe has never meddled in the administrative structures of Member States, although it is very quick to set ambitious strategic objectives, that may well generate an evolution in local governance. The **EU funding toolbox**, for such a polymorphous subject as local food systems, is so complex as to be discouraging. It could well drive an even deeper wedge between the European Union and its most disadvantaged/rural territories.

(With or without SFS law), considering France's multi-tiered administrative structure, a lively debate can be expected around the question of **whether all levels of local governments should be allowed to administer a Territorial Food Programme**, as recommended by Senator Frédéric Marchand: “[...] *give them shared competency for the organisation of sustainable and resilient food and make them Organising Authorities for sustainable and resilient food*” ([Frédéric Marchand, 2022](#)). The senator's recommendation is in line with [that of the EEB](#): *“The SFS Law should envisage National Sustainable Food Plans to engage all levels of governance and maximise effectiveness”*.

This contradicts the latest position of the National Food Council ([CNA, Conseil National de l'Alimentation](#)). When solicited in February 2023 by the Ministries of Health, Environment and Agriculture, to which it is affiliated, to contribute to the National Strategy for Food, Nutrition and Climate (SNANC), the CNA recommended instituting **competency for 'sustainable food' within the local authority bloc (municipalities & intercommunalities)**.

- This is a simple & cynical way of getting past the issue of the lack of funding for short, organic food chains. It's also a way of nipping in the bud innovations such as the PAIT (Inter-Territorial Food Programmes), a means of massively reterritorialising food chains.



FOCUS A: Multi-tiered social policies towards quality food for all

***The CAP has generated a certain type of response to the growing challenges of food insecurity in an otherwise prosperous Europe.**

Twelve years ago, in the fall of 2011, a disagreement among European agriculture ministers broke out concerning the continuation of the European Food Aid Programme (so called “PEAD”): this aid benefited 13 million of the poorest Europeans. The PEAD, established in 1987 by Frenchman Jacques Delors and linked to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), *“planned to make agricultural raw materials available to Member States from European intervention stocks (cereals, milk powder, sugar, etc.). Surplus agricultural products, which were previously stored or destroyed to support prices and ensure a decent income for farmers, could then be purchased through a public intervention procedure”*¹².

*** France - Germany: divergent political views on ‘PEAD’**

Social issues are the responsibility of the Member States, so any initiative can raise particularly divergent views. In December 2008, Germany, supported by Sweden, filed a complaint with the CJEU against the European Commission to cancel the annual financial regulation of the PEAD for the year 2009. Germany obtained the annulment of the financial regulation in the first instance, on the grounds that “the annual budget of the PEAD must primarily be built using available intervention stocks” (which was not the case for the 2009 ‘PEAD’ program). As a result, the overall budget of the ‘PEAD’, which was 500 million euros in recent years, was reduced to 113 million euros for 2012.

An agreement between France and Germany on the future of the ‘PEAD’ was reached in November 2011. France agreed to an extension for the following two years - 2012 and 2013 - in exchange for abandoning the program starting in 2014. And due to the reduction in European intervention stocks (a change in the

¹² Source : N. BRICAS & al., Une écologie de l’alimentation, Editions QUAE, 2021.

CAP strategy at the time), the PEAD was replaced in 2014 by the FEAD (European Fund for Aid to the Most Deprived), which partially funds food aid.

* **Civil society responses in each country, in a changing European context**

The inspiration for the PEAD by Jacques Delors was supported by the visionary and provocative attitude of a French comedian, Michel Colucci, also known as Coluche, who created the [Restaurants du Cœur](#) in 1985. This non-profit organization is one of the four French food banks. Over the course of 40 years, with an army of volunteers, locations provided by local authorities to reach the entire territory (including rural areas), and the mobilization of artists (for an annual show and album), the "RESTO DU COEUR" has become a national pillar. In the fall of 2023, when the association called for help, it raised 32 million euros in two months to ensure the survival of this service co-produced by citizens. In France, in 2020, it was estimated that 8 million people were part of a household experiencing food insecurity.

In Germany, an association called Die Taffel ("The Table") was launched in 2005, 20 years after the "Restaurants du Cœur". It distributes food aid: *"For one euro and after long queues, the neediest receive food packages twice a week, leftovers collected by volunteers from supermarkets"* (source: RFI, 2019). This movement, like in France, continues to grow (+10% per year in 2019, even before the acceleration effect of COVID).

Food banks in Germany advocate for the ability to collect surplus food from large retailers, following the model implemented in France since 2016 with the Garrot law (linking food aid to the fight against food waste ; tax exemptions are granted to distributors and agri-food companies that distribute their unsold products through food banks). In France, this comes with criticisms like: *"This linking anchors food aid to a 'nameless' sector that relies on the long circuits of the agro-industrial system"* and also: *"the tax exemption is not targeted to specific products, resulting in an imbalance in the range of products recovered"* or even: *"the Garrot law has underestimated the impact of food aid... I am surprised to see how far public health is pushed aside"*.

*** Facing this crisis in the food aid model: blossoming experiments in France**
(source: our exchanges in 2023)

TERRITORY - Project Holders	Genesis and Bias	Results and Lessons Learned
<p>Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes</p> <p>CIVAM Network/ GESRA (network of social and solidarity grocery stores)</p> <p><i>Action-oriented research: AcceCible</i></p>	<p><i>-Raise awareness among the different stakeholders involved in the issue of accessible sustainable food</i></p> <p><i>-Bring together actors from both the agricultural and social sectors for the first time on this subject, to develop solutions for universal access to sustainable and quality food</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Film "La part des autres" directed by JB Delpias and O. Payage (over 500 screenings) • Colloquium on 28/03/19 • Action research report 'Food democracy and access to sustainable food for low-income families', by D. Paturel - INRAE 2018 • Other resources for wider deployment
<p>Agglo Lens - Lievin Les Anges Gardins, Ménadel System</p>  <p><i>Dominique Hays, President Anges Gardins & member of the national Cocagne network</i></p>	<p><i>-Since 2011, the town hall of Loos-en-Gohelle entrusted the operational management of the Vital policy (similar to the "PAT") to the Anges Gardins association.</i></p> <p><i>-Process of popular education.</i></p> <p><i>-Then, Inter-Reg France - England funding (ASPIRE).</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of a non-profit centre: Ménadel • With a Service Exchange System, actors are not paid in euros but with MANNE ([Local] Currency of Another Nature for New Exchanges)

<p><u>PETR TERRE DE LORRAINE</u> 4 intercommunalities + 153 rural municipalities ADT QUART MONDE <i>Now, for dignity on our plates</i></p>	<p><i>-Action-oriented research launched by the NGO 'ATD Quart Monde' in a rural territory east of Nancy. -7 years of testing. -"A long-standing aspiration of social action professionals": to find alternatives to the model of food banks, in order to improve dignity for participants.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empowering people to take action (theatre piece: Hunger Pains – <i>Les maux de la Faim</i>) • Working with, giving voice ('OAP Lab': Observations / Analysis / Proposals) • Reducing isolation / 500 people out of the 10,000 people in the territory below the poverty line are involved
<p>Throughout France « Alliance des tables libres et vivantes (Alliance of free and vibrant tables) <i>Manifeste de l'Alliance (2019)</i></p> 	<p><i>-Pride in the profession of a chef and at the same time, a step aside from the shadow of French 'cuisine gastronomique' (an elitist model that often relies on the exploitation of kitchen staff, contracts between top chefs and agri-food industries, standardization at the expense of the individual, etc...)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 70 professionals gathered • Break free from the narrative of French haute cuisine • Invent hospitality-focused dining • Advocate for the social aspect of food transition; highlight unseen work (local agricultural production and food valorisation)

Source: interventions by stakeholders at the 4th Sustainable Food Meeting (D. & N. Carasso Foundation), October 10, 2023, at the ALTA event (October 11, 2023), in Loos en Gohelle (June 28 and 29, 2023), and at the "End of the Restaurant" political day (Alliance des tables Libres et Vivantes, Gennevilliers, September 16, 2023)

This table has been completed thanks to the works of the Food Social Security, which take place in large cities like Montpellier (for the entire population) and Bordeaux (for students). Less frequently in small towns like [Dieulefit](#) in the Drôme region.

***"Tomorrow, our names may be added to the list"¹³ [of people eligible for the right to food]**


[Magali Ramel, French jurist](#), specialist in **the right to food**, summarizes the major turning point that is taking place: "*This is a right recognized at the international level, but especially relevant in the context of the fight against hunger worldwide and **not recognized in any developed country***". The decision was therefore made to experiment with approaches other than those born in the context of an abundance society and the surplus stocks of the Common Agricultural Policy of the 80s.

Is Germany, a wealthier country than France, still distant from these humanistic energies? Far from it: it should be recalled that **FIAN** was founded in 1986 to fight for the realization of a **human right to food**. This NGO, active worldwide, has its international secretariat based in **the city of Heidelberg** (Baden-Württemberg). In autumn of 2023, FIAN International and FIAN Belgium published a [study on the right to food](#), defined as follows:

"The right to food is the right of every individual, alone or in community with others, to have physical and economic access at all times to sufficient, adequate, and culturally acceptable food that is produced and consumed in a sustainable manner, in order to preserve future generations' access to food. The right to food is not limited to the right to be free from hunger. It corresponds to the right [...] to celebrate life through shared meals in communion with others [...]. The right to food requires states to ensure that populations are always dignified in their food consumption. In this regard, the right to food raises fundamentally political questions about how we produce, distribute, and consume food, to which the often technical terminology related to food security does not provide answers."

It is still too early to know whether this issue, first and foremost social, will be left in the hands of each Member State and the potential creativity of its civil society and what progresses will be made at the European level.

¹³ ([song by "Enfoirés - Resto du cœur"](#))


	<p>POLICY ANALYSIS 2: Well-being in rural areas: moving away from pesticides?</p>
<p>Publication date on www.ARC2020.eu : August 2023</p>	<p>Beyond the Harvest: Health Effects of Pesticides on French Farmers Agricultural and Rural Convention (arc2020.eu) (1st part) The True Toll of Pesticides on Rural Health - Pesticides Analysis Part 2 Agricultural and Rural Convention (arc2020.eu) (2nd part)</p>



Anti-cancer product (epirubicin[®]), administered in cases of aggressive breast cancer ([leading cause of cancer mortality in women](#) in Europe)

Scientific studies: the mother-child cohort in California points to the responsibility of exposure to pesticides for certain cases of breast cancer, after several decades of observations

State of play in each of the two countries:

FRANCE	GERMANY
European Champion in Pesticide sales volume	N°2 in Europe
Application: 3.44 kg/ha/year	Application: 4.05 kg/ha/year
12=% organic farms in 2020 (+ 8 points /2010)	10% organic farms in 2020
<i>Territorial coverage by Cancer registry (=health monitoring of the population)</i>	
<p>Very limited (20% / for cancers)</p> <p>Les Registres de cancers en 2019</p>  <p>Source: FRANCIM</p>	<p>Full coverage</p>  <p>Source : GEKID.de (above: incidence of prostate cancer)</p>
<i>Epidemiological monitoring & research, targeting male and female farmers:</i>	
<p>- AGRICAN cohort (created in 2003, within the limits of the partial data). One of the first cohorts of this type in the world</p> <p>(Their work confirms the link between pesticides and certain cancers in farmers)</p>	<p>There is no epidemiology dedicated to this subject in Germany</p> <p>(Without a German cohort the only possible comparison to AGRICAN in Europe is in Norway)</p>

Summary of the article (in 2 parts) published on www.arc2020.eu:

Rachel Carson, with her book published in 1962, was already talking about the absurdity of anti-cancer campaigns if carcinogens are allowed to multiply. The Sustainable Use of Pesticides (SUR) regulation still proposes at least another thirty years of coexistence with pesticides, as its objective is the phasing out of pesticides by 2050 (one of the objectives of the Farm to Fork **strategy attached to the Green Deal**). **Can we afford to wait another three decades? No, say those who advocate for an 80% reduction by 2030 (rather than 50%). Despite its inadequacy, the 50% reduction target was rejected by the European Parliament on November 22nd, 2023 ("a dark day in Europe"), a worrying symptom of the misinformation about the harmful effects of pesticides.**

This article is based on accumulated knowledge of the impact of pesticides on health, distinguishing two types of exposed populations: farmers and other professional pesticide users ([Part 1](#)) and rural communities ([Part 2](#)).

The [first part](#) highlights French initiatives serving the health of farmers affected by pesticide exposure, including the INSERM study (2013; 2021). The real damaging power of pesticides in general, and their carcinogenic effect in particular, is demonstrated. Looking in detail at how this scientific demonstration is produced leads to one conviction: if we had more extensive independent means of conducting studies, the list of pathologies attributable to pesticides would undoubtedly be longer. And when we consult sources other than INSERM, we find cancers such as cholangiocarcinoma "on the rise in all age groups" or bladder cancer ("quadrupling of risk in women farmers") or breast cancer (Californian research team, based on a cohort followed over several decades), etc.

Two other French initiatives **with no equivalent in Germany** are described in detail:

*The [PHYTO VICTIMES association](#) (in operation since 2011): working for the recognition of occupational illnesses linked to pesticides, and above all to deconstruct the discourse on plant protection products, which for too long has been given to young people in training. In the space of 10 years, the association

has helped to have Parkinson's disease (2012), malignant haemopathies (2015) and prostate cancer (2022) recognised as occupational illnesses in farmers.

*The [AGRICAN cohort](#) (set up in 2003), the world's largest study of cancers in the agricultural workplace, carried out by researchers at the François Baclesse Centre in Caen and the University of Bordeaux.

Exposure to pesticides is still one of the **territorial inequalities** that is least presented or commented on: [the second part of the analysis](#) pulls on this Ariadne's thread to continue our overview of the impact of pesticides on the health of rural people. In France, while the general population is unaware that their country remains the leading consumer of pesticides in Europe, just ahead of Germany, rural communities are observing pesticide spraying practices with increasing suspicion, indignation or worse, resignation.

Living together in rural areas also means agreeing to debate the health impacts of agricultural inputs. Some of the topics below provide a good indication of the controversies that exist in France but are shared across Europe:

*Many people working in rural areas dare not explicitly incriminate pesticides (even though prevention is relevant in these under-medicalised areas). In France, a wave of anti-pesticide decrees has been issued by rural and peri-urban mayors (in 2019-2020, in the context of municipal elections), illustrating a growing awareness. And rightly so!

*According to a study published by the [IARC](#), **the incidence rate of childhood cancers in Europe** has risen by 1 to 3% per year over the last three decades (mainly leukaemia and brain tumours). Sick and in some cases terminally ill children are the most hideous face of pesticides.

*Given the scale of the health disaster, **the definition of buffer zones**, one of the crystallisation points of the SUR regulation during 2023, appears to be more of a distraction: converging studies (France-ATMO / INSERM study / work by two German NGOs: Bündnis für eine enkeltaugliche Landwirtschaft and Umweltinstitut München) conclude that **pesticides circulate over very long distances**.

<i>MULTI-TIERED RURAL POLICIES</i>	Summary of multi-tiered policies mentioned in analysis 2:
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EU: European Directive on the sustainable use of pesticides adopted in 2009
Farm to Fork strategy, which was to have been translated into a SUR regulation (but the European Parliament voted against it on November 22nd 2023)

<p>National (FR) : The ECO-PHYTO III/2030 plan will soon be launched, in line with the "Farm to Fork" strategy (ECO-PHYTO I started from the Grenelle national consultation in 2007 ; the target of halving use by 2018, identical to SUR, was never achieved)</p>	<p>National (DE): As in France, "the implementation of existing regulations on the use and risks of pesticides" is the main problem today, with an opportunity to "better separate public and private interests".</p>
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<i>SCREENING OF SOLUTIONS</i>	Summary of possible solutions (analysis 2):
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COUNTERING MISINFORMATION OR A LACK OF INFORMATION¹⁴:

- The **common thread** running through the analysis is that farmers have not been sufficiently informed about the dangers of pesticides to human health, first and foremost for their own sake ([Part 1](#)). And more broadly, for those living near crops (including their own families), and rural communities, who are paying a high price for the "pesticide rush" ([Part 2](#)).
- **‘Santé Publique France’** is the gov agency responsible for **health prevention in France**, and in 2022 the ‘Cour des Comptes’ recommended an **"information campaign on organic food and health"**. However, this does not make overexposed rural populations a particular target for public health and prevention policies.

¹⁴ Our own inventory of "EUPHEMISATIONS OF THE HEALTH IMPACT OF PESTICIDES" (not exhaustive: there are so many!) has been made available to partner associations.



Advocacy contributions

Analysis 2: Well-being in rural areas: move away from pesticides?

The French initiatives (described in [Part 1](#) of Analysis 2) can serve as a "model" because they are useful, if not essential, components of a public policy for phasing out pesticides:

- These French initiatives (**INSERM, AGRICAN, PHYTO VICTIMES**) have the merit of providing other 'truths' about pesticides than those peddled by those who sell them.
- **Recognition of pesticide-related occupational illnesses** is a good start, because it could wake up an entire profession that is largely hypnotised by outdated productionist rhetoric. It is also a first step towards the application of the « **polluter pays** » principle (an entirely justified application, albeit a very partial one).
- The AGRICAN cohort has succeeded in turning one of **France's weaknesses (the lack of complete coverage by cancer registries: see [table FR / DE](#))** into a strength, and in producing a clear message: yes, cancers (sometimes difficult to cure) are more common among French farmers than in the general population ...

Finally, each of these initiatives helps to remove the dramatic medical consequences of pesticide exposure from the realm of individual¹⁵ responsibility/blame: the aim of any public policy remains to reason in terms of targets (in this case, sub-groups of the population that are more exposed and/or more vulnerable, such as children).

¹⁵ A medical thesis by Dr Juliette Heinrich (defended 21 November 2023, University of Nantes): "Risk factors for cancer in the CARENE (Communauté d'Agglomération de la Région Nazairienne et de l'Estuaire)". It illustrates a significant shift in focus from individual risk factors (tobacco - alcohol) to environmental risk factors (including pesticides) and occupational exposure (the study area around Saint-Nazaire and its estuary). The study area may be sub-departmental (5th interco /17 in premature mortality before the age of 65 in Loire Atlantique), even if the data remains patchy. The work also provides an interesting critique of the lack of data in cancer registries (the Loire Atlantique is one of only 20 of the 100 departments with such registries, which is better than nothing, but there is still room for improvement).

On the other hand, as these initiatives focus on remedial action¹⁶, they cause little disruption to the "conventional agriculture exporting but dependent on inputs - upstream and downstream agri-business" system.

- As demonstrated by FOODWATCH study¹⁷: **Taxes on the most toxic pesticides in Denmark have been the only public policy instrument identified to date** that has succeeded in reducing dependence on pesticides (-40%). This approach is an appropriate application of the "polluter pays" principle and is more effective because it is applied before the product is purchased and used by the farmer.
- The judicious application of pesticides is not one of France's strong points, as it is stuck in its pride of being an exporter of agricultural products (volumes of pesticides sold have stabilised, despite the ECO-PHYTO plans). As a result, the focus on the loss of farm yields resulting from the renunciation of pesticides may be stronger than elsewhere (instead of thinking more globally, at least in terms of farm income, reduced by the purchase of inputs).

The technical and economic reasoning to be applied in the context of the relocalisation of food chains (an approach that is mandatory if we are to reduce greenhouse gas emissions) is very well documented, described and tested at different geographical levels by the French association SOLAGRO: organic farming (70% of UAA in 2050) + reduction in food waste + reduction in meat consumption + reduction in dependence on imported inputs (including nitrates). (cf [AFTERRES 2050 scenario](#) - no equivalent in Germany, but many actors could adapt it to the farm Germany or sub national areas).


While the double setback of "glyphosate 2033 - rejection of the SUR regulation" in November 2023 remains a mortal danger for some Europeans in the medium to long term, it may also be an opportunity to broaden our reasoning to denounce inaction, because:

¹⁶ Example 1: epidemiological monitoring of populations, a long time after these molecules with questionable properties have been marketed, even though they are known to be dangerous even after toxicological tests on animals / Example 2: compensation for pesticide victims is sometimes paid long after they have died.

¹⁷ New report released by the NGO FOODWATCH "Locked-in pesticides" • Agroecology Europe (agroecology-europe.org)

- The most astonishing thing about the previous [draft SUR regulation](#) is to read such statement : « *This proposal does not have an impact on the EU budget* ». If we can find this, it is because the "polluter pays" principle, enshrined in the founding texts of the EU, is far from being applied (among the exceptions: the compensation fund for farmers who are victims of occupational illnesses is funded by the plant protection industry, with no relation to the real damage or the real number of victims). Considering the financial insecurity of carers of people suffering from pesticide-related illnesses (and rest of the family), the economic insecurity of non-farmers suffering from pesticide-related illnesses (local residents), etc.: how can Europe continue to authorize the mass sale of pathogenic substances while ignoring such socio-economic consequences and underestimating the impact on health? **The division of powers between Europe and the Member States on health policies facilitates this institutional and political denial** of the financial burden of pesticides.
- And it is thanks to this permanent and massive denial of the health impacts of pesticides, with **their unimagined socio-economic consequences**, that the "pesticide system" has held up for so long. To put an eloquent figure on the global scale of this denial: the 2016 international meta-analysis, published by [D. Bourguet and Thomas Guillemaud](#). They found that only 60 studies had been produced worldwide between 1980 and 2015 to assess the hidden costs and negative externalities of pesticides. In other words, virtually nothing.
- In France: **the 'Cour des Comptes', which represents the "interests of taxpaying citizens"**, provides various estimates on one of the four cost items [detailed by these 2 researchers, taken up by Via Campesina]: the environmental cost of deteriorating water (polluted with pesticides). The Court praises preventive action (for water quality), which could also be applied to human health: **"Prevention ... as an economically more advantageous system than the curative system"**. We await **the translation of this principle of sound economic management into the new version of SUR**, which would no longer ignore the pathogenic effect of pesticides on humans.



One thing is certain: the cost of treating cancer is exploding. This blind spot can be used to strengthen the advocacy of moving away from pesticides.

	<p>POLICY ANALYSIS 3: Access to farmland</p>
<p>Publication date on www.ARC2020.eu : September 2023</p> <p><i>(Input for ARC 2020 annual rural gathering in Germany, Nov. 23, Hesse)</i></p>	<p>Access to Land: Looking to Europe to Secure Local Farmland? Part 1 Agricultural and Rural Convention (arc2020.eu)</p> <p>Access to Land: More Resilient Agriculture - Without Any EU Legislation? (Part 2) Agricultural and Rural Convention (arc2020.eu)</p>
<p><i>Peer review of analysis 3 by Magali Bardou (geographer, local authority executive) and Coline Sovran (advocacy officer, Fédération Nationale Terre de Liens)</i></p>	



Mixed farming and livestock breeding (Massif-Central, FR)

State of play in each of the two countries:

FRANCE	GERMANY														
<i>Number of farms</i>															
<p>(2020): There are 389,800 farms in mainland France, around 100,000 fewer than in 2010 at the time of the last census.</p> <p>(2010): There are 490,000 'farms' in France, compared with over a million at the end of the 1980s, and 664,000 in 2000</p>	<p>(2020) 262 776 farms in Germany <i>(source: Destatis)</i></p>														
<i>Average size of farms</i>															
<p>(RA 2020): 64,6 ha. In 50 years, the average UAA has increased by 50 ha</p>  <table border="1"> <caption>SAU moyenne (ha)</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Average Size (ha)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1970</td> <td>~20</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1979</td> <td>~25</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1988</td> <td>~30</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2000</td> <td>~45</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2010</td> <td>~60</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2020</td> <td>64.6</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>Source: Agreste, october 2022</i></p> <p>(2010) 52,6 hectares in average.</p>	Year	Average Size (ha)	1970	~20	1979	~25	1988	~30	2000	~45	2010	~60	2020	64.6	<p>63 ha (2020) (10 years ago, this average was 56 ha). 14% of farms work 62% of the utilised agricultural area: in the east, 86% are large farms of over 100 ha (see the above card).</p>  <p><i>Source: Destatis</i></p>
Year	Average Size (ha)														
1970	~20														
1979	~25														
1988	~30														
2000	~45														
2010	~60														
2020	64.6														
<i>Land tenure: direct / indirect</i>															
<p>2/3 of French farmland is farmed indirectly</p>	<p>75% of German land is farmed indirectly (tenant farming)</p>														
<i>Demographic transition in rural areas</i>															
<p>47. Rural business succession – Rural Trends</p> <p>On this Europe-wide map, the situation in Germany looks in better shape than in France</p>															

Summary of the article (in 2 parts) published on www.arc2020.eu:

The system of land regulation is particularly complex (it was established long before the advent of the CAP): what **paths have France and Germany followed in their common and singular histories?** Agricultural land is subject to a **striking economic paradox**: it is an essential factor in agricultural production, but outside the scope of European public policies (agricultural or environmental). We are at the start of a decade in which **generational change among farmers** is jeopardising whole swathes of European agriculture. Hence the need to pay close attention to these issues.

Some instruments, such as the **right of pre-emption** ([part 1](#)), have been used as a basis for proposals to build a [European land policy from scratch](#) (the VIA CAMPESINA proposal is a topical issue for 2023). This right is a small common denominator between France and Germany when it comes to agricultural land issues. In France, the farmer's right of pre-emption is one aspect; the SAFERs (regional development agencies - *Sociétés d'aménagement foncier et d'établissement rural*), and local authorities, also exercise this right of pre-emption in other cases.

Continuing the comparison between these two European giants, [part 2 of the analysis](#) looks at the extent to which **the Lander/Region level is autonomous and relevant when it comes to adapting land policies to local realities**. Finally, because civil society remains one of the driving forces behind the agro-ecological transition, **citizens' initiatives** remain a means of putting land at the centre of attention. The associations [Terre de Liens](#) in France and Regionalwert-AG in Germany are working to ensure that farmland is available for new entrants and agricultural renewal in each of these two major European countries.

As the threat of climate change and demographic change becomes clearer, the list of tools recommended by the European Parliament in 2017 - "*already applied within the EU, such as **the right of pre-emption, surface area ceilings and the creation of public land reserves***" - can be extended: regional land banks (one day co-financed by Pillar 2 of a transformed CAP?), citizen landholdings, incentives for small landowners to "offer" their land on a tenanted basis, schemes to bring transferors and those with alternative agricultural projects closer together, etc.

EU: No directive or regulation on access to agricultural land.

The only basis for national policies on agricultural structures is the relationship between Articles 49, 54 and 50 (rights of nationals of other Member States) and Article 39(2) (need to make gradual and appropriate adjustments to the CAP) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

↔ A major paradox, because "*without an EU agricultural land policy, it will not be possible to implement the Green Pact, the 2030 Biodiversity Strategy, the Farm to Table Strategy, the Territorial Cohesion Policy or the long-term vision for rural areas*", states Via Campesina's "[Proposal for a Land Directive](#)" (§ 24).

National (FR):

The Modernisation Act dates from 1962; this legislation requires farmers to acquire ownership of the land they farm. The next major agricultural policy law comes around every 10 years: LAAAF in October 2014 (e.g. creation of the SDREA); the next law was presented to Parliament at the end of 2023 (see proposals by TERRE DE LIENS, with the Coalition Foncière, on agricultural land access).

National (DE):

The Land Law came into force at virtually the same time as in France, on 28 July 1961.

Minor changes were introduced in 1974 and 1986 (and then in 2005, 2006 and 2008 following reunification).

Regions: No decentralisation like in Germany.

Only the implementation of land policies is regional: SAFER; control of agricultural structures (installation / enlargement, under certain conditions). It has moved from departmental to regional level (law in the future of agriculture - LAAAF in October 2014): with the SDREA (Regional Master Plan of Farms), drawn up by the regional prefect (representing the French government) in consultation with the farming profession.

Länders: Since 2007, federal laws remain in force until they are replaced by laws of the Länder: it is up to the Länder to take the initiative, as Baden-Württemberg did in 2010.

In Baden-Württemberg, the rural development company, on the basis of the 2010 law on the improvement of agricultural structures, can also exercise the right of pre-emption in favour of its land bank, without having a second buyer immediately.

- **Faced with agricultural land policies (at national level) that have become anachronistic and/or highly unequal:**
 - The citizen land property companies [Terre de Liens](#) in France and Regionalwert-AG in Germany: illustrating how citizens, whether close to the agricultural world or not, are finding their place in this societal issue.
- **As the European level is still ineffective (for land issues):** to what extent is it appropriate to rely on the regional level (*following the example of Germany, which has been decentralising its agricultural land policy since 2007*)?
 - Face-to-face workshop with the national federation Terre de Liens, 30 November 2023 (on Regional Master Plan for Agricultural Holdings [SDREA] in their regulatory environment: SRADDET (regional master plans for planning, sustainable development and equality of territories) & CAP NSP 2023-27).

Advocacy

Advocacy contributions

Analysis 3: Land Access

There are many obstacles to overcome before a **structuring instrument such as the right of pre-emption becomes widespread throughout Europe:**

- Historians believe that *"the [agricultural] orientation laws have simply inflected the line of slope by accentuating the process of eliminating the smallest producers"*, and conclude by affirming that **"the large farms have suffered little from the theoretical barriers [including the right of pre-emption] erected to block their expansion"**. More current data shows that the role of **the right of pre-emption exercised by the SAFER**

remains marginal (even if the rest of Europe would like to have such legal instruments).

- **The right of pre-emption is a fairly complex legal instrument:** *“The rules governing the exercise of pre-emption rights are unique in that they are partly based on public law (public land and planning policies) and partly on private law (including property law and inheritance law).”* [Litigation on pre-emption](#) is therefore shared between the two levels of court, with all the risks of dysfunction that such a situation entails. The reading of this law, in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights (with which any law of a Member State must comply), is as follows: *“It should be emphasised that, with regard to litigation concerning the consequences of the annulment of a pre-emption decision, that the distribution of competences in this matter remains difficult to understand”*.
- Over the long term, *“the enduring rivalry between two agrarian models, the small farm and the large farm”* remains palpable: the logic of farm expansion induced by the CAP and its pillar 1 dominates. To the point of creating monsters: farms so large and costly that they have *“become non-transferable”*. In fact, the European Parliament's recommendation in 2017 to give *“priority to small and medium-scale local farmers and to new and young farmers”* sometimes goes unheeded. The gradual monopolisation of land resources by investors from outside the farming world has taken hold. Even in a well-administered country like France, the statistical machine is incapable of describing and characterising the profile of shareholders in open-ended agricultural companies. Since the beginning of this century, agricultural censuses have turned a blind eye to this major fact.

The CAP is an agricultural policy that is also, albeit not obviously, an agrarian policy with little regard for social concerns (**land grabbing, allowing Pillar 1 grabbing**). It is therefore through CAP Reform (**lower ceiling on direct payments**) that Europe can begin to regulate agricultural land.

Restoring water
as a common good

POLICY ANALYSIS 4:

Water as a common good... and climate risks, a common destiny

Publication date on
www.ARC2020.eu :

October 2023

[Water as a Common Good - Part 1 | Agricultural and Rural Convention \(arc2020.eu\)](#)

[Water as a Common Good .. and climate risks, a common destiny - Part 2/2 | Agricultural and Rural Convention \(arc2020.eu\)](#)

FOCUS B: EUTROPHICATION OF FRESH & COASTAL WATERS: WHEN (AND HOW) EUROPEAN JUSTICE CAN FORCE THE POLITICAL WILL OF MEMBER STATES



Water Convoy, mobilised in front of the French Loire-Bretagne Water Agency (August 25th, 2023) (FR)



The Loire, Orléans - August 2023 (FR)



The Lahn (tributary of the Rhine) – Nov. 23 (DE)

State of play in each of the two countries:

FRANCE	GERMANY
<p><i>Watersheds & main split line between watersheds in Europe -----</i></p>	
<p>The human occupation of the European territory has been built around rivers: the watersheds areas therefore remain one of the relevant geographical networks of rurality.</p>	
<p><small>©S2004 A. Darmochwał - Benutzug im Rahmen der GMA/ FDI_gestattet</small></p>	
<p>Source: Europe - Bassins hydrographiques et lignes de partage des eaux • Carte • PopulationData.net</p>	
<p>France and Germany together have watersheds that flow into all the European seas: the Mediterranean sea, the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, the Baltic sea and the Black Sea. This is another way of illustrating their geostrategic weight, with freshwater as a key resource (and the seas, which suffer from the negative externalities of agriculture).</p>	
<p><i>Rate of weather risk insurance cover for agriculture</i></p>	
<p>Only 17% of the UAA (Utilised Agricultural Area) is insured</p> <p><i>(Source: French Ministry of Agriculture and Food Sovereignty, April 2023)</i></p>	<p>Crop insurance: 68.7% of farmers surveyed</p> <p>Livestock insurance: 42.8%</p> <p><i>(Source: Palinkas & Szekely – Wageningen Academic, 2008)</i></p>

Summary of the article (in 2 parts) published on www.arc2020.eu:

The development of mega-basins in France is a shocking example of the monopolisation of **water, our common good**, which is leading to the accelerated aridification of areas that have adopted these predatory pseudo-solutions (Chile, California, Spain). In France, the summer of 2023 will also have been marked by the mobilisation of farmers from the Confédération Paysanne and other citizens, including activists from the “Bassines Non Merci!” collectives, united in the joyous and courageous procession of the **‘Convoi de l’Eau’ (water convoy)**. Their demand is simple: a moratorium on the use of public funds to finance mega ponds.

The irrational development of mega-basins is part of what some researchers call **"insurance through irrigation"**. 7.3% of farmland will be irrigated in 2020, compared with 5.8% in 2010 (source: France Nature Environnement), and this is only the beginning, given the many "replacement reserve" projects currently under consideration. **Are there more collective and, above all, more sustainable solutions to the major risks of drought and other climate disasters?** How can we overcome this umpteenth paradox of our "douce France", now at the forefront of climate change, but **lagging behind in Europe when it comes to multi-risk climate insurance**)? By comparing ourselves with a major country like Germany, what lessons can we learn on these sensitive and essential issues?

Farmers have to deal with four basic methods of managing risks (climate or otherwise): **acceptance** (of the risk); **transfer (via insurance)**; **risk reduction** (on a case-by-case basis); and finally **diversification** (to reduce the overall impact of risks associated with a particular type of activity).

[Part 1](#) is devoted to the **difficult transition from 'risk acceptance' to the transfer of climate risks** (the first of which is drought) to insurance companies: developments that reveal inequalities in the situation of European farmers.

[Part 2](#) looks at **the resilience ... of this system of resilience in French agriculture (multi-risk climate insurance)**, with a mirror image of two European countries with different 'solutions' of reassurance: **Spain and Germany**.

<i>MULTI-TIERED RURAL POLICIES</i>	Summary of multi-tiered policies mentioned in analysis 4:
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EU: Commission Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 of June 25th 2014 declaring **certain categories of aid in the agriculture and forestry sectors and in rural areas** compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)

<p><u>National (FR):</u> Reform in 2022 of the multi-risk crop insurance system and foundation of reinsurance, based on the Spanish model (law of March 2nd 2022, preceded by the Descrozaillies report)</p> <p>Order no. 2022-1075 of 29 July 2022, following the law of March 2nd 2022: future French reinsurance model for agriculture.</p> <p>The EAFRD has taken over the task of subsidising membership of the Climate Multi-Hazard Insurance Scheme via the second pillar of the CAP (for the 2014-2020 programming period and beyond).</p> <p>Distribution of EAFRD responsibilities in the French CAP NSP 2023 - 2027: the State allocates subsidies for Multi-Hazard Insurance</p>	<p><u>National (DE):</u> in 2015, a federal framework directive on the payment of subsidies to compensate for damage in agriculture (and forestry) caused by natural disasters or adverse weather conditions.</p> <p>Nothing equivalent (in the reinsurance sector, which is highly globalised: two of the three world leaders are German, MUNICH RE and HANNOVER RE.)</p>
<p><u>Regions:</u> N.A.</p>	<p><u>Länders:</u> However, 'private sector solution' is not always the rule in Germany: compulsory "contributions" (Beitragspflicht) are paid by livestock farmers to the Länders (and not to insurers) so that they can be compensated in the event of illness in their livestock.</p>

- **Articulation between the agricultural insurance system** (subsidised by Pillar 2 of the CAP) **and the reinsurance system** (public/private). **Major differences from one European country to another**, linked to history and shared responsibilities, which combine with **inequalities in exposure to climate change**.

- Europe is addressing this issue by **monitoring the solvency of reinsurance companies** (a highly globalised sector, like all financial services).



Advocacy contributions

Analysis 4: Water as a common good... and climate risks, a common destiny

* **Using the insurance system (including its reinsurance component) as an angle of analysis to show that the agricultural system is not prepared to withstand the onslaught of climate change (which is already happening):**

- **Key figures:** The [economist Jean Cordier spoke publicly at the Varenne de l'Eau](#) concertation process about some key figures: "*the State will only put up €600 million a year to reinsure agriculture, [...] that's far too little. It's twice what's needed: €1.3 billion a year*". **If the financial integrity of the insurance system is already undermined today by an underestimation of needs, what will it be like in 2030? 2040 or 2050 (climate forecasts are already known and worrying)?**
- **The key mechanisms of multi-risk climate insurance: the "Olympic average"** (excluding the best and worst harvest years of the last 5 years), insurance will never be an adequate resilience mechanism in the face of the onslaught of climate change, particularly drought. What's more, **this tool for adapting to climate change deprives us of harvests.**

* **Identify inconsistencies in the objectives of national public policy (in France, which has far fewer resources than Germany):**

The Act of March 2nd, 2022 sets **ambitious targets for improving insurance cover for French farms** (an opportunity for progress when compared with Germany and other European countries). Depending on the type of production, (at least) a **doubling of cover** under a multi-risk climatic insurance policy (in 10 years 2020/2030):

Pourcentage des surfaces assurées par un contrat d'assurance multirisque climatique (surface assurée / surface totale) par production

	Données pour 2020	Objectif cible pour 2030
Céréales, oléagineux, protéagineux, plantes industrielles	33 %	60 %
Vignes	34 %	60 %
Arboriculture	3 %	30 %
Prairies	1 %	30 %
Légumes (industrie et marché du frais)	28 %	60 %
Horticulture	3 %	30 %
Plantes à parfum, aromatiques et médicinales	6 %	30 %
Autres cultures (non assurables à ce stade)	n.s.	n.s.

Source: [LOI n° 2022-298 du 2 mars 2022 d'orientation relative à une meilleure diffusion de l'assurance récolte en agriculture et portant réforme des outils de gestion des risques climatiques en agriculture \(1\) - Légifrance \(legifrance.gouv.fr\)](#)

It should be noted that these ambitious objectives (important though they are for the long-term survival of some existing farms) are not included in the French CAP NSP 2023 - 2027, as **the line devoted to risk management tools remains virtually flat** throughout the period of implementation (in terms of the number of farms concerned), ignoring the objectives set by the law of March 2nd 2022 (so, in fact, not financed?!)


R.05 Gestion des risques	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
M.05 Nombre d'exploitations agricoles disposant d'outils de gestion des risques	433 694					
50.01 PO Fruits & Légumes		114	680	1 095	1 095	
76.01 Paiement des primes d'assurance	55 074	56 000	56 500	57 000	57 500	58 000
76.02 Fonds de mutualisation	433 694	433 694	433 694	433 694	433 694	433 694
76.03 Instrument de stabilisation du revenu de la filière betterave sucrière	0	3 665	3 665	3 665	3 665	3 665

"With an annual average of €186 million earmarked for multi-risk climate insurance and the 'health and environment mutual fund', the NSP acts across the board with the aim of increasing the proportion of areas covered by these tools, in addition to the more targeted measures mobilised in the fruit and vegetable operational programmes" (source: CAP National Strategic Plan 2023 - 2027 - Annexes and appendices, 2022 - version validated by the EU in August, 6 months after the law of March 2nd 2022).
Does it mean that a high rate of growth of farm surface is expected and forecast?




FOCUS B: EUTROPHICATION OF FRESH & COASTAL WATERS: WHEN (AND HOW) EUROPEAN JUSTICE CAN FORCE THE POLITICAL WILL OF MEMBER STATES

The analysis of the consequences of scarce water, a quantitative issue, must not mask the problems of freshwater and coastal water quality, common to both France and Germany: **eutrophication** (this phenomenon follows the over-enrichment of water by nitrates and phosphorus of agricultural origin, which leads to an anarchic development of certain aquatic plants and a depletion of oxygen in the water). Eutrophication affects many lakes, reservoirs, rivers and coastal areas in France and the rest of Europe. It causes major disruption to aquatic ecosystems, with impacts on animal and human health and on economic activities, including tourism. There have even been deaths, as revealed in the fantastic investigation "**Green Algae, the forbidden story**" (see photo), a cartoon strip and then a film that was a success in France in 2023, despite the technical nature of the subject.



As the general public takes up this complex subject, exasperated by the inaction, misinformation and destruction, one question arises: what can they expect from European and national institutions?

Nitrogen surplus in Europe (2005) – kg/ha



This map shows that, for at least the last two decades, Germany has had just as acute a problem as Brittany and the north-west of France (in purple and red): the disastrous consequences of intensive agriculture (including livestock farming). One difference lies in the dominant colour of the proliferating algae on the respective coastlines of these two countries: "*Green algae [Ulva armoricana & Ulva rotundata] are not the only ones capable of proliferation and accumulation in enriched areas... A brown ectocarpal alga (pheophyceae), Pilaiella Littoralis, first described in Massachusetts, often abounds in the Baltic Sea and seems to be spreading to several sites in Brittany*". Green, brown or red tides are therefore a global phenomenon, as described by [Alain MENESGUEN](#), the most visible and smelly face of the negative externalities of so-called conventional agriculture.

***The negative externalities of "Nitrates" agriculture: Europe over the long term, with the role of the Court of Justice of the EU (formerly ECJ):** European legislation on nitrate levels goes back a long way. In 1975, a European Directive (75/440/EEC) decreed that catchment water should not contain more than 50 mg/litre of nitrates, and that Member States should aim for a guide value of 25 mg/litre. By 1985, average concentrations in Brittany's rivers were

exceeding 50 mg/litre. In 1988, IFREMER scientists demonstrated that the main cause of green tides was nitrates from intensive farming (nitrogen inputs to crops and effluents from intensive livestock farming: slurry and other manure).



A river in Cévennes (FR)

In 1991, Europe approved the [Directive 91/676/CEE](#), on the protection of waters polluted by nitrates from agricultural sources. This directive had to be transposed into national law by December, 19th, 1993, **so Member States have been working to restore nitrate levels for 30 years**. In 2000, the European Water Framework Directive required groundwater and surface water bodies to achieve good ecological status by 2015, although the timetable could be extended to 2027.

These regulatory objectives are still very much in the news in Europe, thanks to **possible condemnations by the ECJ - since 2009, the CJEU** (Court of Justice of the European Union). As the EIPA explained to senior French civil servants in 2004 (just as the greening of the CAP was beginning to be mooted): *"The CJEU is there to force the political will of the Member States; if there is no political will to implement EU law, the CJEU knows what to do"*. **In the field of the environment, in 2005, half of the proceedings for incorrect application of European Directives concerned water.**

Admittedly, the CJEU knows how to do this, but history shows that it has had to do it several times over. In France, [‘l’association Eau et Rivières de Bretagne’](#) played a major role: as a result of its complaint in 1993, the European Commission gave France formal notice to comply with its Directives. France's line of defence was initially to prevaricate (with procedural arguments); the French authorities took *"a very long time to understand the Commission's demand for an organic action plan"* (referring to an obligation of means, rather than an obligation of results). In the end, France was ordered to pay penalties between 2002 and 2007. Heavy but not dissuasive: in June 2013 and September 2014, France was condemned again by the Court of Justice of the European Union for insufficient application of the Nitrates Directive. The entire history of this dispute can be found on the Eaux et Rivières de Bretagne website, with a concise summary: *" [The mirage of applying European law](#)"*. The story continues

in 2023 with the distribution of drinking water by lorry to areas too polluted by nitrates... as drought concentrates pollutants in scarce water ...

***Possible solutions: in principle, multi-tiered, but in practice?**

The [European Commission monitors the application](#) of Directive 91/676/EEC: « *During the reporting period [2016-2019], there were **ten ongoing infringement cases** against Member States: [including the one] **against France, concerning the designation of nitrate vulnerable zones (closed in 2019); against Germany**, concerning the action programme ...A high percentage of groundwater monitoring stations still show levels above the maximum of 50 mg nitrate/L [notably] in Germany [...] The Member States that stand out for their large number of eutrophic waters are the Czech Republic, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium, **Germany**, Latvia and Poland ».*

In response to these condemnations, “*the [French] ministers for ecology and agriculture wanted to find out exactly **what our European neighbours [including Germany] were doing**, what their successes were and what their visions were for the future*”¹⁸..

As this effort to study European good practice is taking place in 2015, the year in which the **Paris Climate Agreements are being prepared**, one short paragraph rightly focuses on the link between nitrate reduction and greenhouse gas mitigation: “*The Nitrates Directive could be presented differently in order to encourage livestock farmers to consider animal nitrogen as a resource that should not be sent into the atmosphere but should be recovered as much as possible by spreading (with immediate burial), so as to reduce N2O and NH3 emissions. This would significantly reduce the manufacture and use of chemical fertilisers, thereby also reducing CO2 emissions. It should also be noted that optimising the feeding of dairy cows to reduce the production of nitrogen in the context of DN can make a correlative contribution to reducing methane emissions into the atmosphere*”⁽⁸⁾. Tiny improvements regarding the size of the issues: climate change !

¹⁸ [La directive nitrates dans six États membres de l'Union européenne | Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Souveraineté alimentaire](#)

The rest of the study report is confined to dissecting **small incremental solutions**... once again out of all proportion to the scale of the problem to be tackled. For example, it focuses on a future draft law in Bavaria: "*Distance from watercourse: 3m (4m in the next ordinance); may be reduced to 1m if precision spreading; on slopes > 10%, the distance is 5m. More stringent local measures possible: Baden-Württemberg: 5m*". In concrete terms, this injunction to produce action plans in the event of a dispute with the CJEU is leading to a great **deal of creativity... on small-impact measures**. Other institutional players note that "*the establishment of buffer zones is compulsory along rivers and lakes, but they are not always respected*" (Banque des Territoires). Given the stalemate: no lever for progress can be neglected!

This was an ongoing issue during the process of validating the French CAP NSP 2023-2027 (National Strategic Plan): the (independent) Environmental Authority played its part by calling for a significant effort to be made in this area.

- Le PSN a été complété par une intervention visant à **diminuer les flux de nitrates et de phosphates vers les masses d'eau**, comme le recommandait l'Autorité environnementale. Une MAEC « système » supplémentaire a été ajoutée au catalogue des MAEC surfaciennes proposé à l'échelle nationale ayant pour objectif de répondre notamment à cet enjeu et en particulier à la nécessité de lutter contre la **prolifération des algues vertes**. Cette MAEC est adaptée aux exploitations des baies algues vertes où l'enjeu est le plus clairement identifié, conformément au diagnostic préalable à l'élaboration du PSN, et propose aux agriculteurs de mettre en œuvre des pratiques limitant la fertilisation et les fuites d'azote vers les masses d'eau, ainsi que des pratiques de couverture des sols et de réduction de l'utilisation des herbicides.

Source: Plan Stratégique National de la PAC, Déclaration environnementale, MASA 31/08/22

The actions of local authorities are regularly highlighted: "The switch to agroecology in catchment areas has produced decisive results, with pollution control costs cut in half. This was the case for the city of Munich in Germany, which since 1991 has been encouraging farmers located in the area of influence of water catchment points to convert to organic farming. Their tap water is now pure and untreated, whereas before it was highly contaminated with nitrates » ([Banque des Territoires](#)). In France, the original measures taken by the [city of Rennes](#) (a city the size of Munich) to reduce nitrate levels in drinking water, in collaboration with farmers in catchment areas, are increasingly being publicised. The aim is to remind people that there are agronomic, economic and ecological solutions.


*** In conclusion: is the (relative) application of EU law bad publicity for Europe?**

All Europeans retiring today have lived their entire adult lives under the "protection" of the Nitrates Directive: theoretical protection, as mentioned above, because even the successive rulings of the CJEU do not encourage a more radical change of model (less intensive livestock farming with nitrogen effluents, more plant-based rations). Such a change is also desirable if greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture are to fall significantly.

If they suffer from digestive cancer, they may have come across the information that high levels of nitrates in water increase the frequency of these cancers - not the easiest to treat or endure. Only the extra cost of treating the water to make it drinkable will protect them (not the Directives alone). And possibly their own dietary choices, or the area in which they live (as with pesticides, there are major territorial inequalities).

While they are particularly shocked by the war that has broken out on Europe's doorstep, they have also learned that French agriculture, which boasts about its "food sovereignty", is in fact 90% dependent on imports of nitrogen fertilisers from Russia and China. Only organic farming, by introducing nitrogen-fixing plants into crop rotations, can restore food sovereignty on this key point.

So how much space will be given to this issue in the next 6 months of the European campaign? No doubt a discreet one, because the subject remains complex and has been entrenched for half a century.

	<p style="text-align: center;">POLICY ANALYSIS 5: Regional Nature Parks: Islands of resilience ?</p>
<p>Publication date on www.ARC2020.eu: November 2023</p>	<p>Islands of Resilience: Nature Parks in France & Germany Agricultural and Rural Convention (arc2020.eu) (1st part) Islands of Resilience Part 2: Land Planning and Biodiversity Agricultural and Rural Convention (arc2020.eu) (2nd part)</p>



Geological marvel in the Bauges Regional Nature Park (Geopark label) (FR)





Outcrop of volcanic rock (basalt), fringes of the Naturpark Lahn - Dill - Bergland (DE)



Agro-forestry landscape in the Cévennes National Park (FR)

State of play in each of the two countries:



Summary of the article (in 2 parts) published on www.arc2020.eu:

At a time when climate change is set to shape the agenda for "multi-scalar" agri-rural public policies, we believe it is appropriate to build on what already exists in the regions - including regional nature parks, a concept shared by several Member States.

In the [first part](#), highlighting the experience of regional nature parks is a way of pursuing a **cross-analysis of the France/Germany trajectories towards the construction of more resilient rural territories**. Two economic sectors, **eco-tourism and sustainable agriculture**, are trying to develop in these areas, although there are a number of conflicting priorities. The essential fuel for these rural policies, the LEADER funds, has had some specifically French failures, which should be recalled to encourage vigilance in the other Member States.


In this year when French-style "ecological planning" has been in the news (but without mentioning the PNR!), it is worth remembering the **Regional Nature Parks**, which are governed by a concerted charter, a planning tool with a 15-year strategic horizon: with the Voynet Act of 1999, the charters of the Regional Nature Parks (PNR) became, in principle, **sustainable territory projects, which a rural community adopts to bring to life and preserve an exceptional territory**. In Germany, **nature parks (Naturparke)** are created on the initiative of associations and are largely financed and managed on a collegiate basis by the Länders, administrative districts and municipalities. The major difference with the French PNRs is that a **plan is voluntary** and indicative in nature. But in the end, 80% of NaturParks have one!

In France as in Germany, these project areas embody **bottom-up approaches**: the mantra of the LTVRA (Long Term Vision for Rural Areas) community.

As the primary intention of the LTVRA is to "better integrate public policies", in order to drive an ecological and social transition, the coexistence of the two major economic sectors in rural areas: agriculture and tourism, is useful to observe. And this brings us to the **cross-cutting issue of the water cycle**. But adapting to climate change is not a priority for the LTVRA either, which is still based on an old, classic vision of "prosperous territories", where natural resources are a mere adjustment variable.

In the second part of the analysis (sub-titled: “Land Planning and Biodiversity” ‘(A)ménagement et biodiversité’), there is a description of the progress made by certain French regional nature parks, which, like the German nature parks, have acquired a **UNESCO Geo Park label**. By having a label managed at international level, these local initiatives can be seen as a race to attract tourists at international level (nibbling away at the market share of the ‘grand canyon’ with each geo park awarded the label), or on the contrary as a relocalisation of tourist wonder (having a sort of a Colorado in every region).

The Cévennes National Park, which is unique in many respects, is working with the 11 surrounding regional nature parks to **give life to (sustainable) spatial planning concepts such as ecological corridors**. This network of parks, known as IPAMAC, was set up in 1998 and has been built well beyond traditional administrative boundaries. The funding obtained comes mainly from **ERDF funds** (which allocate too few resources to **the protection of biodiversity and nature**).



The Stevenson Trail (GR 70), one of IPAMAC's achievements (FR)

<i>MULTI-TIERED RURAL POLICIES</i>	Summary of multi-tiered policies mentioned in analysis 5:
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(First part of the analysis: "Regional Nature Parks, islands of resilience")

EU: LTVRA (Long Term Vision for Rural Areas) / Cohesion Funds (such ERDF) / CAP Pillar II (EAFRD)	
<p>National (FR): The creation of a PNR is governed by the Environment Code (decree signed by General de Gaulle on 1 March 1967). Voynet Law (1999): PNR charter, 15-year planning (approval granted for 12 years) ANCT: managing authority for ERDF funds Ministry of Agriculture: managing authority for certain EAFRD lines</p>	<p>National (DE): What a nature park should be is defined in Article 27 of the Federal Law on the Protection of Nature (NaturParks have existed since 1957)</p>
<p>Regions: Managing Authority for LEADER funds (grants awarded to LAGs) since the MAPTAM Act of January 27th 2014¹⁹</p>	<p>Landers: Germany has a longer history of decentralisation than France (in general and for the management of European funds). Regional nature protection laws (governing a number of issues, including whether or not planning is compulsory)</p>
<p>Sub-regional: Regional Nature Parks (within the perimeter of several inter-municipalities); some Regional Nature Parks are LAGs</p>	<p>Infra-regional: NaturParks are created on the initiative of associations. They are largely financed and managed collectively by the Länders, administrative districts and municipalities (recreational facilities are mainly financed privately or through public-private partnerships).</p>

¹⁹ Only the Alsace region has been able to do this on an experimental basis since the LEADER 2000-2006 programme.

(2nd part of the analysis: "Regional Natural Parks, islands of resilience")

UN: UNESCO Geopark label (classified category III by the IUCN)	
EU: Nature Restoration Law approved on July 12th, 2023	
Sub-regional: Regional Nature Parks (on the perimeter of several inter-municipalities); some Regional Nature Parks are applying for the more ambitious Geopark label.	Sub-regional: NaturParks (the first European geoparks were certified in Germany)


<i>SCREENING OF SOLUTIONS</i>	Summary of possible solutions (analysis 5):
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- Inter-territorial cooperation networks:
 - o **EUROPARC Federation** (German association initiative)
 - o **European Geoparks Network:** 94 geoparks in 28 countries
 - o **IPAMAC:** Horizontal, multi-decade cooperation between the Cévennes National Park and 11 Regional Nature Parks embodying the concept of ecological networks

- Integration of public policies (with a view to better protection of natural resources, and therefore resilience of territories and rural communities)
 - o **Agriculture / Tourism:** even in areas with traditionally plenty of rainfall (e.g. Massif-Central), the water cycle is becoming a cross-cutting issue and therefore central to both of these rural economic policy areas.
 - o **While regional nature parks are intended to be a relevant scale for building coherence between agriculture and tourism,** there are some counter-examples: such as the Länder of Schleswig-Holstein, which limits the objectives of the nature park to a single objective,

namely recreational activities including tourism (it should be noted that Schleswig-Holstein is one of the few Länders to have both types of park in its territory: national parks and NaturParks)

- **Land-use planning (through sustainable agriculture) and biodiversity:** example of the HVN (High Natural Value) score, which is high in the Cévennes (the only French national park with an inhabited heartland in a mid-mountain area).



All the French regional nature parks currently revising their charters have the same timeframe as the LTVRA (i.e. 2040); the same applies to all the new regional nature parks being created or under study.

For the sake of nuance or openness to all forms of future territorial innovation, the LTVRA and its related work do not explicitly mention **the rural project territories** such as regional nature parks (or their German equivalent: naturparks). This means that we are missing out on a concept that unites a number of European countries, at a time when the climate emergency is upon us. And the certainty that the territories will be left to their own devices or, in the best case scenario, to their own capacity to develop relevant local approaches.

One of the primary intentions of the LTVRA is to have “**more integrated public policies**”, the mantra for driving an ecological and social transition that breaks with what already exists. Consequently, the coexistence of the two major economic sectors in rural areas: agriculture and tourism, is useful to observe. And this brings us to **the cross-cutting issue of the water cycle**. But adapting to climate change is not the priority of the LTVRA either, which is still based on an old and classic vision of "prosperous territories", where natural resources are a simple adjustment variable (and not the limiting factor for two of the main economic sectors). To be followed during the debates for the next European

elections - and afterwards: how the allocation of European funds takes account of this inescapable fact.

Geoparks are areas of resilience. They show us that European territories, including Germany and France, feel the need to differentiate themselves, by moving towards a label from a **"supra" European entity, such as UNESCO**, and at the same time gaining two levels in the IUCN classification (category V to category III).

In this year of 2023, when the political agenda in Brussels has been marked by the (so difficult) passing of the Nature Restoration Law, it is useful, if not essential, to **highlight long-term initiatives such as that of IPAMAC**. Although the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes region is the 2nd metropolitan region supported by the ERDF, only a tiny budget line is devoted to the protection of Biodiversity and Nature.

In this Europe of the Regions, there is horizontal and inter-regional cooperation, beyond the traditional administrative borders, on complex and essential issues such as biodiversity.



**Conclusions of the RURAL RESILIENCE
2023 annual report:**

**- MASSIFICATION (OF AGRO-
ECOLOGICAL TRANSITION)**

- SUBSIDIARITY

- TERRITORIES (OF SURVIVAL)

*(Three key words that cut across the five
2023 analyses)*



Corn crop as a symbol of the lack of integration between agricultural policy and water policy (Haute-Saintonge, FR)

The news at the end of 2023 illustrates the relevance of the Rural Resilience phase 2 approach: bringing together the two major countries of the European Union. A much larger producer and exporter of agricultural raw materials, Ukraine, has begun the [process of joining the European Union](#), a process that is not expected to take place before the 2030s. And for what remains urgent to deal with until then: the simultaneous [abstention of France and Germany in the glyphosate vote](#) has unfortunately left Europe swimming in glyphosate for a long time (Germany having previously planned to ban it on its territory).

Looking back over the past few weeks, what can we learn from the trajectories of the two countries (France & Germany), on the subject at hand? It seems that Germany has been the good pupil of the CAP - a policy that is more central than ever in the EU:

*"After the Second World War, when the construction of Europe was launched, a sort of division of labour emerged between France and Germany: **Germany was destined to become the dominant industrial power in the European Union, while France was promised the rank of agricultural leader.** This was not only the consequence of a political construction, but also the result of a **particular agricultural geography** [...]. It was therefore not expected that the German agricultural sector, fifty years after the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), would **gain in productivity and export market share, to the point of supplanting France as early as 2004**" (source: [Th. Pouch](#), 2015).*

Is this the end of the story? No, because in each of these two major European countries, the agroecological transition has only just begun. In contradiction with this export strength, better and shorter local food supply chains ([analysis 1](#)) will [not find the expected help from the European level](#) because the SFS Law was finally withdrawn from the European Parliament's agenda, at the end of the term. One of the main arguments for better agriculture, for the health of all: a **drastic reduction in the use of pesticides** ([analysis 2](#)), has also been undermined by the rejection of the SUR regulation. In addition to pesticides, these two countries are also suffering from the negative externalities of CAP agriculture, including nitrate pollution of waterways ([focus B](#)).

In a phase of accelerated – or even runaway – climate change, **access to land** ([analysis 3](#)) and **access to water** ([analysis 4](#)) must become fundamental, as they are essential production factors for agriculture (and therefore inseparable from any political reflection on agriculture and rurality).

Over and above these topical elements on the Brussels agenda, three key words emerge from our exchanges with rural territories in 2023²⁰:

²⁰ See also in [appendix 1](#) the description of the collective intelligence work process followed in 2023

- **MASSIFICATION OF THE AGROECOLOGICAL TRANSITION: WITH WHAT FUNDING?**

As several of our five analyses show, funding is not sufficient to drive and succeed in the agroecological transition in rural areas (sustainability of funding for Territorial Food Projects in France not ensured: [analysis 1](#); amount earmarked for the reinsurance of French agriculture largely underestimated: [analysis 4](#); decrease in LEADER funding for the new programming period, limiting the scope of action of Regional Nature Parks, for example: [analysis 5](#); etc.).

Most innovative approaches can be financed (with European funds, which are essential for many national, regional, sub-regional projects) because so few players are innovating. When it comes to a change of scale (i.e. much more than a few exemplary projects here and there), **all the necessary project engineering, imagined today on a 'demo' scale, would be unable to withstand a massive scale-up using the same resources.**

At the same time, large-scale solutions devised in the late 1980s are no longer satisfactory for the players most involved (e.g. , the treatment of food precarity, [focus A](#)).

Today's and tomorrow's needs could also exceed the possibilities offered by the range of good solutions already implemented: food aid, multi-risk climate insurance, short distribution channels, etc.

Hence the interest in examining **the negative externalities of conventional agriculture** (pesticides: [analysis 2](#), nitrates: [focus B](#), etc.), with the hope (too often dashed) of turning conventional agricultural production and food distribution systems around. Moving **from curative to preventive action remains an under-exploited lever**: for the health of people (in addition to that of ecosystems) and for the economic health of member states and their inhabitants. It is so under-exploited that 360° education and information is needed, to which this report aims to contribute.

As it is neither certain nor given that the resources needed to meet the challenges of our times will be available to the Green Deal projects in the next term of EU parliament, some players are concentrating on bringing about changes to the law (sometimes described as the 'poor man's weapon'): the right of pre-emption ([analysis 3](#)), the right to food ([focus A](#)).

- **SUBSIDIARITY: THE GATEWAY TO MORE INTEGRATION BETWEEN POLICIES ?**

One of the common threads running through all five Rural Resilience analyses in 2023 is the **coherence of multi-tiered policies**, where the sharing of competences and the principle of subsidiarity are at the heart of the reasoning.

The CAP has just seen a major turning point in the application of **the principle of subsidiarity**, with the introduction of the NSPs (National Strategic Plans 2023 - 2027; discussed in [Analysis 1](#) and [Analysis 4](#)). In the member state and decentralized levels, this subsidiarity is either well institutionalised (the Länders vs. the German federal state) and still improving (example cited in [analysis 3](#): the Länders have been able to deal with land issues for over a decade); or, as is often the case in France, highly perfectible and still fragile. In this way, **French-style "ecological**

planning" is being handed over to the Regions, at the start of the 2023 academic year, even though the law has already provided for it for almost 10 years, with the SRADDET (regional master plans for planning, sustainable development and equality of territoires). **Decentralisation from the State to the Regions is still relatively young in France (4 decades)**, compared with the way German institutions have operated since 1949 (nearly 75 years). **Agriculture remains the French government's preserve**, and when it drew up the NSP, it relinquished some responsibility to the Regions for the installation of young farmers - without calling into question **the principle of co-management by the State and the majority farmers' union, which we feel remains much stronger than the principle of subsidiarity**.


The various analyses published this year as part of the Rural Resilience project highlight the **importance of the regional level**, in the French sense of the term (and its corollary: the Europe of the Regions). **A regional level that remains ambiguous**: a level at which the equality of treatment, so dear to the French Republic, can be applied, or a political and administrative perimeter that can be adapted to geographical specificities and other realities (as in the Länders).

In the [Europe of the regions/Länders](#), the machinery of European funding is at work. In some French regions, LEADER funds will no longer be available for established project territories (the PNRs): in [Analysis 5](#), for example, this drift, to which we are alerting, illustrates **the worst face of subsidiarity: a form of regional Jacobinism which**, like national Jacobinism, is very top-down. This backward step could wipe out several decades of **more horizontal territorial projects, more conducive to integration between public policies**. Let's not forget that the Europe of the Regions has flourished because it has always been **easier to promote dialogue at the level of living territories (and therefore to de-siloise agri-rural policies) than at the level of ministerial silos, or DGs at the European level**.

At a time when **adaptation to climate change** is imposing itself ever more brutally on our lives, the Europe of the Regions seems to be facing new challenges.

As the map below suggests, in vast countries like France or Germany (with several contrasting climatic zones), **the Region / Länder is the first level at which adaptation to climate change can take place**, urgently affecting the most sensitive sectors (water /forests /agriculture-food /health /essential needs of populations): **adaptation can be a new compass, as it prescribes a list of public policies that urgently need to be made coherent**. **Adaptation** offers an imperative and historic opportunity to de-siloise public policies, with the necessary cross-border dialogue, because climate change does not respect administrative boundaries:

A European map of agricultural adaptation to climate change



Source: [Home | AWA - AgriAdapt platform for adapting farms to climate change](#) (4 countries involved in this LIFE project, with a total of 120 farms: **France / Germany / Spain / Estonia**).

Each of the two countries analysed this year to provide food for thought on Rural Resilience is divided into two different climate change adaptation zones. A Mediterranean France and an oceanic France; an oceanic Germany, which can interact with France (north of the Loire), and a **more continental Germany, which can interact with the Eastern European countries neighbouring Ukraine**. This geography of zones of climate vulnerability illustrates the growing importance of Germany on the European chequerboard: **still the true centre of gravity in the construction of Europe yesterday, today, and tomorrow**.

In Europe, **adaptation to climate change is shaping a new force towards greater subsidiarity**: from the member states, whose climate denial sometimes wears thin²¹, to the sub-national levels: the regions/Landers, the National Nature Parks/NaturParks (cf. [analysis 5](#)).

²¹ New Year's greetings on 31 December 2022, in which French President Macron asked about the year 2022: *"Who could have predicted the wave of inflation that has been unleashed? Or the spectacular effects of the climate crisis in our country again this summer [2022]"*.

- TERRITORIES (OF SURVIVAL): A LONG STORY OF RURAL TRANSITIONS?

According to the European LTVRA (Long Term Vision for Rural Areas), **active and innovative rural communities hold the key to their destiny in their hands**. While European funding is not always available (not all of it earmarked for rural areas) and/or more difficult to mobilise by rural local governments (of relatively small size), there is always, in theory, the last resort of the inexhaustible reserve of creative energy of citizens, or simply their voluntarism, with the added bonus of their ability to exchange best practices.

The gap with reality needs to be underlined: the (relative) “underdevelopment” of the countryside dates back several centuries (so the voluntarism of the inhabitants was not enough).

Where does rurality, as we see it today, come from? It is rooted in territories of survival²². Worse still, some rural areas have had to fight against top-down, ill-conceived and destructive public policies. **The history of rural areas is characterised by a deeply survival-oriented narrative!** Contemporary indicators (e.g. **analysis 2**) tell us that life in rural areas remains, according to certain important criteria, less easier than in urban areas.

On the face of it, however, for some people (at all levels of the *millefeuille* – local, regional, national and European), everything seems straightforward: in general, to turn every citizen into a conscious consumer; in particular, to turn every tourist into a convert to local produce. Even occasional visitors to rural areas are caught up in this **simplifying injunction that everyone must take the lead in the agroecological transition** ([analysis 5](#)).



Cévennes sweet onion producer store (FR)




Sale of local produce at a tourist information store (DE)

Even though more than **50% of GHGs are not linked to good individual behaviour, but to public policy decisions**. As soon as it comes to **amplifying mobilisation, this polarity between individual or even collective behaviour (within small communities: family, neighbourhood, village) vs. larger-scale political decisions is at the heart of the debate**. There are many differences between

²² It takes five generations on average in the OECD for a descendant of a poor family to reach the average income in his or her country, and **as much as six in France or Germany**. That's an average of 180 years. Only three generations in the Scandinavian countries.

France and Germany in terms of **the forms of civic engagement** (which are themselves the fruit of a singular history): French associations under the 1901 Act, focused on the fight against exclusion or leisure activities, public services co-produced by citizens (e.g. fire and rescue services) and [German political foundations](#).

Average standardised value scale scores in France (black) and Germany (grey) in 2017 and ranking of scores among the 22 countries in the European values study



Basically, the [deep-rooted motivations for civic involvement - values](#) - seem to differ from one country to another: the French people are less politicised, less civic-minded, **less environmentally minded**, but also less attracted by the market economy and liberal democracy than their German neighbours (see above).

And what the above study describes as [acceptance of] "authoritarian politics", "adherence to authority" also includes the relationship to taxation. The French, who pay [the highest taxes in Europe](#) (some of which are used to finance public deficits), also **expect public players (multi-tiered policies) to do their part in the agroecological transition**, including protection in the face of crises. Do It Yourself (see [analysis 1](#)) therefore seems to make more sense in Germany, where **zero public deficit is enshrined in the constitution**. Up to a point, because in Germany, the final weeks of 2023 were marked by [announcements of exceptions to this budgetary rigour](#): major ecological transition projects require exceptional resources.

In short, even for the last resort: citizen mobilisation (when public policies fail or don't keep

their promise), History (the long-term view) remains the compass for understanding and acting more justly when it comes to rural resilience.

In each of our five analyses, we have summoned up the long term: at the very least, a decade for Territorial Food Programmes / Food Policy Councils ([analysis 1](#)); often, half a century (60 years after R. Carson's Pesticides alert: [analysis 2](#); 55 years after the creation of the French Regional Nature Park based on the German model: [analysis 5](#)) or even a century (more than a century's hindsight on land tenure appeared necessary: [analysis 3](#); solidarity against agricultural calamities born between the two wars and German reinsurance imagined at the end of the 19th century: [analysis 4](#)). A mandatory bias towards the subject of multi-scalar public policies, given the singular history of each of these countries, European approaches and rules are not always easily imposed.

This appetite for the long term can also be applied to future periods. Work on mega trends, such as that carried out under the **Horizon 2020 Ruralization program**²³ (see details in [Appendix 2](#)), enables us to do just that.

²³ The French partners in the Consortium of 18 partners & 12 countries [Consortium – Ruralization EU](#): the Terre de Liens federation and CNRS (public scientific research agency); in Germany, Kulturland and ILS Research Institute for Regional and Urban Development.

The 10 mega trends out of the 60 trends²⁴ identified summarise the choices of analysis for 2023:

	https://ruraltrends.eu/	(HORIZON 2020: 2019-2020)		Rural Resilience Phase 2
N°	Simple Trend Cards – Rural Trends	<i>Type of trends</i>	Yes?	<i>Our comment:</i>
1	Ageing population	Megatrend	A2	<i>-excess mortality from cancer and other chronic diseases (linked to pesticides) combined with an ageing population</i>
3	Benefiting from globalisation	Megatrend	F-B A2	<i>-see also negative externalities (nitrates, pesticides) of conventional agriculture for export</i>
4	Benefiting from urbanisation	Megatrend	A1	<i>-PAIT (cooperation between rural and urban areas for resilient food systems)</i>
6	Caring for the environment	Megatrend	A2 A3 A4 A5	<i>-pesticide-free; caring for precious resources (water, biodiversity in nature parks)</i>
10	Climate change	Megatrend	All	<i>-should be renamed “super mega trend”</i>
13	Counteracting unequal development and rural decline	Megatrend	A5 A3 A2 F-A F-C	
26	Growing food demand	Megatrend	F-B	<i>-refers to rebalancing vegetal / animal production (to cope with this trend & also fight climate change)</i>
28	Infrastructures, accessibility and connectedness of regions	Megatrend	(A5)	<i>-comparison between ERDF funds on biodiversity vs investments in roads!</i>
34	Migration patterns	Megatrend		
58	Sustainability transition	Megatrend	All	

²⁴ 10 mega trends + 20 trends + 30 weak signals

GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

Collective Intelligence approach:

- **Diversify sources of information** (academic/administrative/practitioners/...); **do not ignore physical realities.**
- **Cite the sources (as everyone can reappropriate the initial information and interpret it differently): mix written & oral sources.**
 - With exceptions (e.g. "do not quote" policy, if the interviewees so wish).
- **Confront points of view, with neutrality** (rely on facts: maps, figures, open data public databases, etc.); **rely as much as necessary on lessons learned over time** (thanks to historians' work).
- **Apply the philosophy of the Aarhus Convention: a participatory process has a prerequisite** i.e. bring all participants to the same level of information, if needed).
↔ **Some analyses have had this prior information function (e.g. before the annual rural gathering²⁵, co-organised by ARC 2020).**

STEP I: CHOICE OF THEMES, INFORMED BY FIELDWORK:

- Results of phase 1 (see illustration 1 in the editorial of the report)
- The author's experience over (at least) the last 5 years of the agroecological transition in France (e.g. local food projects, the water cycle, medical demography in rural areas, etc.).

²⁵ The annual rural gathering is not an event exclusive to the Rural Resilience project. Therefore, it is out of the scope of this report.

- Two targeted interviews with resource people (in areas not visited during phase 1), providing a 360° view: Nicolas, an elected official from a *commune* in the Grenoble metropolitan area & Raphaël, director of a regional CIVAM federation (early March 2023).

- **Validation of the five themes by the President of ARC 2020: March, 13th, 2023**

- Informal meeting on 8 April 2023 with long-standing colleagues from SUP AGRO Montpellier: Prof Jean-Louis Rastoin, Dr Leila Temri, Dr Anne Rollet.

STEP II: PROCESSING THEMES BY CROSS-REFERENCE OF "HOT" DATA (participation in events / supplemented by interviews) AND "COLD" DATA (see bibliography / webography)

Analysis 1: Territorial Food Programmes and Food Policy Councils

Participation in events	Complementary exchanges
<p><i>3 events for the topic PAT / FCP</i> (April to June -1 event in-person)</p> <p>*Presentation of website territoiresaufutur.org (Programme Résilience et transition écologique des territoires au SHIFT PROJECT / Grenier d'Abondance) (May 10th)</p> <p>*RURALITÉS & CO: les rencontres des territoires peu denses et petites villes édition 2023- LES RURALITES DESIRABLES (June 1st)</p> <p>*Journée de lancement du réseau régional des Projets Alimentaires de Territoire Occitanie (June 8th, Narbonne)</p> 	<p>Complementary exchanges</p> <p>* VP CD Ariège transition environnementale et sociétale, développement économique et insertion + Son technicien</p> <p>*VP CD Ardennes et déléguée au développement durable</p> <p>* Président Chambre d'Agriculture des Ardennes</p> <p>*Chargée de com° attractivité CD Mayenne</p> <p>*Cheffe de projet Filières locales (courtes ou longues), Chambre d'Agriculture de la Mayenne</p> <p>* chargée du PAT Cote d'Or (March 2020)</p> <p>+ Internal Peer Review: Hans Martin Lorenzen, President of ARC 2020 Board</p>

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- * [Chapeau-n°26-Les-coopératives-agricoles-un-modèle-d'organisation-économique-des-producteurs.pdf \(agriculture-strategies.eu\)](#)
- * [Nos membres - Agrilocal](#)
- * [Une légumerie 100 % ariégeoise - ladepeche.fr](#)
- * [Politique nationale en faveur de territoires très fragiles : Pacte Ardennes : l'Etat et les partenaires s'engagent pour le territoire ardennais - Internet des Services de l'Etat](#)

[Ardennes](#) »)

* [La légumerie départementale : silence, ça pousse ! | cd08.fr : Le site officiel des Ardennes et des Ardennais](#)

[Analysis 2: Well-being in rural areas: move away from pesticides](#)

Participation in events	<i>Complementary exchanges</i>
<p>4 events for the topic PESTICIDES (march to june, 2 in-person events):</p> <p>* Salon des agricultrices (March 4th, 2023, Paris): lecture by Lydia BOURGUIGNON (on chlordecone poisoning in the French West Indies)</p> <p>* Prospective Agriculture européenne sans pesticides chimiques en 2050 INRAE (21/03/23)</p> <p>* Colloque Pesticides & santé au travail (que dit la science en 2023) ? (April 22nd, 2023) organised by the asso PHYTOVICTIMES</p>  <p>* 23 mai 2023 : Territoires durables et "une seule santé" - ADT-Inet (adtinet.fr)</p>	<p>-Antoine LAMBERT, President of the asso PHYTOVICTIMES (04/22/23)</p> <p>-Pr Pierre LEBAILLY (coordinator Cohort AGRICAN) (online meeting: 05/10/23)</p> <p>- Retired nurse (04/22/23) (widow of Yves, one of the founding farmers of PHYTO VICTIMES)</p> <p>-Agricultural worker on a cereal farm in the Ile de France region (04/22/23)</p> <p>+ <i>Internal Peer Review:</i></p> <p>-Andrzej Nowakowski, Member of the ARC 2020 Board (May 2023)</p>
<p>Bibliography / Webography:</p> <p>* R. Carson, Printemps silencieux (Silent spring), traduit de l'anglais par J. F. Gravrand, préface du professeur Heim. - Persée (persee.fr)</p> <p>* Pesticides et santé – Nouvelles données (2021) · Inserm, La science pour la santé</p> <p>* Agir pour sa santé contre les risques de cancer - Ref : PREVPRIMAIRE21 (e-cancer.fr)</p> <p>* Des traces de chlorothalonil R471811 dans l'eau potable du robinet vie-publique.fr</p> <p>* Pesticides : comment le ministre de l'Agriculture met la pression sur l'Agence sanitaire – Libération (liberation.fr)</p>	

*« [Les cheveux de mon fils de 6 ans, en rémission d'un cancer, contiennent des pesticides agricoles](https://lemonde.fr) » (lemonde.fr)

*[ENQUETE. Chlordécone : les scientifiques alertaient sur les risques de cancer depuis les années 80, selon des archives retrouvées](https://francetvinfo.fr) (francetvinfo.fr)

*[10.07.Q06 : Coûts cachés et juste prix de notre alimentation | Académie d'Agriculture de France](https://academie-agriculture.fr) (academie-agriculture.fr)

*[Le soutien à l'agriculture biologique | Cour des comptes](https://ccomptes.fr) (ccomptes.fr)

*[The hidden and external costs of pesticide use - Archive ouverte HAL](https://hal.inrae.fr) (Thomas GUILLEMAUD & Denis BOURGUET, INRAE Montpellier, 2016)

*[Pestizidatlas 2022 - Daten und Fakten zu Giften in der Landwirtschaft](https://boell.org) (boell.org)

*[Maître Lafforgue, un avocat en guerre contre les toxiques - Le Lanceur](https://lelanceur.com) ([Le Lanceur](https://lelanceur.com))

*[Etude POLLINIS / CCFD Pesticides-un-modele-qui-nous-est-cher_FR-Synthese.pdf](https://lebasic.com) (lebasic.com)

*[2014 Pesticides et risques de cancers - Institut National Du Cancer](https://inca.ca.gov) ([Institut National Du Cancer](https://inca.ca.gov))

*[Espérance de vie : pourquoi autant d'écart entre la ville et la campagne ? - L'Express](https://lexpress.fr) (lexpress.fr)

*[Crise du bio : les appels au soutien de la filière se multiplient / Vie des fournisseurs](https://circuits-bio.com) (circuits-bio.com)

*[Site internet Cohorte AGRICAN \(Bulletin Agrican 2020 N3.pdf\)](https://bulletin-agrican.com) ([Bulletin Agrican 2020 N3.pdf](https://bulletin-agrican.com))

Analysis 3: Land access

Participation in events	Complementary exchanges
<p>3 events for the topic LAND ACCESS (march to June – 1 in-person event)</p> <p>*https://www.eurovia.org/events/eu-high-level-event-more-farms-across-europe/ (March 7th, 2023)</p> <p>*Journée de lancement Projets alimentaires de territoires Occitanie (pat-occitanie.fr) (June 8th, 2023, Narbonne, Afternoon workshop: "Young farmers' Setting up and handing over")</p> <p>*La propriété des terres agricoles en France –</p>	<p>-1 responsable syndical agricole (au Salon Agri.) (Agriculteur en Somme), ancien président des JA Région Hauts de France et Somme (/SDREA) (February)</p> <p>-2 personnes (TERRE DE LIENS Occitanie) (June) :</p> <p>-(ARAC Occitanie – initiative Foncière agricole régionale) (June)</p> <p>+ <i>External Peer Review</i> :</p> <p>-Magali BARDOU, ENS</p>

<p>SFER / TERRE DE LIENS (C. SOVRAN et F. RUFFIER) (June 13th, 2023) L'état des terres agricoles en France (sfer.asso.fr)</p>	<p>Géographie, fonctionnaire territorial en charge d'un PAT au sein d'un EPCI -Coline SOVRAN, chargée de plaidoyer, Fédération Nationale TERRE DE LIENS</p>
<p>Bibliography / Webography:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Sustainable Food Systems Law - EU Food Policy Coalition's Recommendations for a Meaningful Transition (arc2020.eu) * La commune de Villejuif achète une ferme en Puisaye - Tannerre-en-Puisaye (89350) (lyonne.fr) * SUSTAINABLE-FOOD-SYSTEMS-LAW-Recommendations-for-a-meaningful-transition.pdf (foodpolicycoalition.eu) * La propriété des terres agricoles en France - Rapport #2 - Centre de Ressources - Terre de liens * sfer.asso.fr/source/seminaires-politiques-agricoles/videos/20230613_Terre_de_liens_pres.mp4 * Etude-complète-de-l'AEIAR.pdf (safer.fr) * Droit d'héritage, droit du fermage et contrôle des structures agricoles en Allemagne (persee.fr) * Le foncier agricole, nouvel enjeu des politiques d'aménagement de l'espace (openedition.org) * La trajectoire agraire est-allemande au miroir de la mutation post-collectiviste (openedition.org) * <u>Histoire de la France Rurale (Tome 4) – Seuil (1987) – sous la direction de Georges DUBY et Armand WALLON</u> * PRÉEMPTION - Encyclopædia Universalis * SAFER Confédération Paysanne (confederationpaysanne.fr) * Who Are We Hands on the Land (réseau européen auquel adhère VIA CAMPESINA) * Droit de propriété et droit d'exploiter - Persée (persee.fr) * 2023-03-02-Press-release_Land-Directive-publication_EN_Final.pdf (eurovia.org) * land_in_europe.pdf (handsontheland.net) * Le droit de préemption Safer * Le droit de préemption et les exigences de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (openedition.org) * land_in_europe.pdf (handsontheland.net) (comparaison France – Germany) / Hands on the Land for Food Sovereignty ARC2020 (2015). 	

Analysis 4: Water, common good ... climatic risks, collective destiny

Participation in events	Complementary exchanges
<p>1 field visit for this topic:</p> <p style="background-color: #e1f5fe;">« WATER, COMMON GOOD »</p> <p>- August 25th, 2023 in Orléans, on the route of the Water Convoy (in front of the Loire Bretagne water agency)</p> 	<p>-1 agricultural manager VP JA Hérault (at the Salon de l'Agriculture 2023)</p> <p>(Until 2022, arboriculture not insurable)</p> <p>(+ familiarisation with Dorothee Kapsambelis' thesis, work co-financed by the Caisse Centrale de Réassurance, in a specific manner : contribution to the AREA asso internal Jury, led by Dr Anne ROLLET ; exchanges with other members)</p>
<h3>Bibliography / Webography</h3> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Modélisation d'événements climatiques extrêmes sur les productions agricoles à horizon 2050 : Application à la gestion économique du risque - TEL - Thèses en ligne (hal.science) (Dorothee KAPSAMBELIS, janvier 2023) * Climate Free Full-Text An Innovative Damage Model for Crop Insurance, Combining Two Hazards into a Single Climatic Index (mdpi.com) * (318) Varenne de l'eau & changement climatique : adapter les pratiques agricoles – YouTube * Loi 2 mars 2022 réforme du régime de l'assurance récolte en agriculture vie-publique.fr * Top 50 des réassureurs mondiaux – édition 2021 (atlas-mag.net) * Home - InsuResilience Global Partnership). * La couverture des risques en agriculture et les assurances agricoles - Sénat (senat.fr) (2016) LC-269 Assurances-agricoles (senat.fr) * (PDF) Sécheresse et agriculture. Réduire la vulnérabilité de l'agriculture à un risque accru de manque d'eau. Expertise scientifique collective. Synthèse du rapport. INRA Alban Thomas - Academia.edu * Agroseguro, la coassurance à l'espagnole depuis 1978 Agra Presse * Rapport-M.Le Ministre-F.DESCREZAILLE-avec-annexes-.pdf * Journal officiel de la République française - N° 175 du 30 juillet 2022 (legifrance.gouv.fr) 	

*Antón, J. et S. Kimura (2011-03-01), « La gestion des risques agricoles en Espagne », Éditions OCDE, Paris. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kggh4stgtxv-fr>

*[Le Conseil arrête sa position sur l'établissement d'un cadre pour le redressement et la résolution des entreprises d'assurance et de réassurance \(IRRD\) - Consilium \(europa.eu\)](#) (20 décembre 2022)

*[EUR-Lex - 52021PC0582 - EN - EUR-Lex \(europa.eu\)](#)

Analysis 5: Regional Natur Parks, islands of resilience

Participation in events	<i>Complementary exchanges</i>
<p>3 for the topic PNR, ISLANDS of RESILIENCE (from June to September / one in person event)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2 days Loos en Gohelle (June 28th & 29th) programme.pdf (loos-en-gohelle.fr) (the Fabrique des transitions, headed by the former mayor of Loos, is involved in the Avenir Montagne programme) (inf. exchanges on this subject) - Le replay de l'évènement du 26 mai 2023 est disponible ! - PETR Causses et Cévennes (petr-causses-cevennes.fr) (to prepare field visit of August, 4th, 2023) - Update on the LTVRA (09/18/23, 5pm -> 6.30pm) off-line Agriculture and Fisheries Council - Consilium (europa.eu) - High Level Rural Policy Forum (09/28/23) Shaping the future of rural areas (europa.eu) 	<p>--1 agent from the PETR Causses et Cévennes: ("Pays" in the heart of the PN Cévennes including Mont Aigoual) (in Loos)</p> <p>-Owner of the Lou Rey eco hamlet (nature-culture link) (lourey@gmail.com) (August, 4th, 2023)</p> <p>-Pilot for the PAT of the 'Syndicat mixte du Pays du Haut Languedoc & Vignobles' (area of 80,000 inhabitants; 102 communes in the west of the Hérault; very rural): link with the PNR du Haut Languedoc (June 2023)</p>
<p>Bibliography / Webography</p> <p>*Textes adoptés - Une vision à long terme pour les zones rurales de l'UE - Mardi 13 décembre 2022 (europa.eu)</p> <p>*rpo-policy-briefing-rural-pacts-draft-230920_0.pdf (europa.eu)</p> <p>*<i>Mise en perspective à l'échelle européenne de la logique française de contractualisation au sein des Parcs naturels régionaux</i>, Camille GIRAULT, Revue Pour 2022/2 (N° 243), p. 193 à 201</p> <p>*Les parcs naturels en droit allemand Cairn.info (2018)</p> <p>*Verband: VDN - Verband Deutscher Naturparke e.V.</p> <p>*Agriculture et alimentation Fédération des Parcs naturels régionaux (parcs-naturels-regionaux.fr)</p> <p>*Syndicat mixte du Parc naturel régional du Marais poitevin (parc-marais-poitevin.fr)</p>	

- * [Programme Leader : des régions tentées par la départementalisation \(banquedesterritoires.fr\)](https://banquedesterritoires.fr)
- * [La candidature au prochain programme Leader sera déposée en fin d'année - L'Echo du Parc Livradois-Forez \(echo-livradois-forez.org\)](https://echo-livradois-forez.org)
- * [Microsoft Word - Pour une PAC des territoires VF 10 avril.docx \(parcs-naturels-regionaux.fr\)](https://parcs-naturels-regionaux.fr)
- * [carte des GAL | Réseau rural français \(reseau-rural.fr\)](https://reseau-rural.fr)
- * [Nature Restoration Law \(europa.eu\)](https://europa.eu)
- * [carte 58 PNR 082021 \(parcs-naturels-regionaux.fr\)](https://parcs-naturels-regionaux.fr)
- * Géoparc et parcs naturels régionaux - Claire PORTAL, Isabelle AUBRON, Revue Pour 2022/2 (N° 243), pages 305 à 311
- * [VULKANEIFEL UNESCO GLOBAL GEOPARK \(Germany\)](https://vulkaneifel-unesco-global-geopark.de)
- * [European Geoparks Network](https://geoparks.net)
- * [Version-numerique.pdf \(ipamac.fr\)](https://ipamac.fr)
- * [Trame verte et bleue : une politique intégrée \(ofb.gouv.fr\)](https://ofb.gouv.fr)
- * Interview de JP GUERIN, Directeur de l'IPAMAC pour la revue POUR 2022/2 (N° 243).
- * [Haut-Allier > Parc Naturel Régional : la profession agricole s'oppose au projet | Haute Loire Paysanne \(haute-loire-paysanne.fr\)](https://haute-loire-paysanne.fr)
- * [Haute-Loire : la justice annule la décision de la région sur le parc naturel régional du Haut-Allier \(francetvinfo.fr\)](https://francetvinfo.fr)
- * [La Politique de cohésion pour 2021-2027 : vers une plus grande territorialisation ? — Géoconfluences \(ens-lyon.fr\)](https://ens-lyon.fr)
- * [Le FEDER, qu'est-ce que c'est ? | L'Europe s'engage en France, le portail des Fonds européens \(europe-en-france.gouv.fr\)](https://europe-en-france.gouv.fr)

STEP III: IN ITINERE SELF-ASSESSMENT OF THE THEMES CHOSEN FOR 2023

- See appendix 2: "Displaying major rural trends in Europe", based on the work of the [RURALIZATION project \(Horizon 2020\)](#)
- Drafting of 2 focuses (A & B) to obtain a more complete view before final formatting of the report and cross-cutting conclusions
- Putting the work of RURAL RESILIENCE 2023 into perspective with the 10 megatrends of [RURALIZATION](#) (end of report conclusion)

STEP IV: SENDING A V0 OF THE 2023 "RURAL RESILIENCE" CONTENT REPORT TO A PANEL OF 10 PERSONS (already contacted / involved during steps I or II).

Appendix 2



Displaying major rural trends in Europe (as a way to assess in-itinere the choice of themes for the RURAL RESILIENCE Project 2023)

[A1 : Democratising Food policy / A2 : Mode away from Pesticides /](#)
[A3 : Access to Land / A4 : Water as a common good ... climate risks as a common destiny/](#)
[A5 : Regional Nature Parks : Islands of Resilience](#)
FOCUS A: [MULTI-TIERED SOCIAL POLICIES TOWARDS QUALITY FOOD FOR ALL](#)
FOCUS B: [EUTROPHICATION OF FRESH AND COASTAL WATERS](#)

	https://ruraltrends.eu/	(H2020: 2019-2020)		Rural resilience Phase 2
N°	Simple Trend Cards – Rural Trends	Type of trends	Yes ?	Our comment:
1	Ageing population	Megatrend	A2	<i>-excess mortality from cancer and other chronic diseases (linked to pesticides) combined with an ageing population</i>
2	Alternative food systems	Trend	A1	<i>-re-territorialisation of food chains</i>
3	Benefiting from globalisation	Megatrend	F-B A2	<i>-see also negative externalities (nitrates, pesticides) of conventional agriculture for export</i>
4	Benefiting from urbanisation	Megatrend	A1	<i>-PAIT (cooperation between rural and urban areas)</i>
5	Care services	Weak signal	(A2)	<i>-lower medical care services in rural areas (despite higher exposure to pesticides in certain rural areas)</i>
6	Caring for the environment	Megatrend	A2 A3 A4 A5	<i>-pesticide-free ; caring for precious resources (water, biodiversity)</i>
7	Changing gender roles	Trend	(A2)	<i>-AGRICAN: created in 2003, one of the first cohorts in the world targeting male</i>

				<i>and female farmers</i>
8	Cheap rural housing and rural second homes	Weak signal		
9	Circular economy	Trend	(A1)	<i>-reducing food waste, one of the levers for self-financing local food policies</i>
10	Climate change	Megatrend	All	<i>-should be renamed "super mega trend"</i>
11	Co-operatives and partnerships	Weak signal	All	
12	Community-based action	Weak signal	A5 A3 A1	
13	Counteracting unequal development and rural decline	Megatrend	A5 A3 A2	
14	Creative economy	Weak signal		
15	Degrowth	Weak signal		
16	Digital economy	Trend		
17	Diversification of rural economy	Trend	A5	<i>Tourism & agriculture</i>
18	Diversification/specialisation of farms	Trend	A4	<i>-A6 (1st policy analysis in RR 2024)</i>
19	DIY movement	Weak signal	(A1)	<i>-more spread in Germany (/ food council policies)</i>
20	e-commerce	Trend		
21	Ecovillages	Weak signal	A5	<i>-visiting Lou Rey (in Cévennes National Park)</i>
22	Educational farms	Weak signal	(A3)	
23	Food security	Trend	A4 F-A	
24	Food sovereignty	Weak signal	A1 F-B	
25	Food tourism	Trend	A5	
26	Growing food demand	Megatrend	F-B	<i>-refers to rebalancing vegetal / animal productions (to cope with this trend & fight climate change too)</i>
27	Heritage tourism	Weak signal	(A5)	

28	Infrastructures, accessibility and connectedness of regions	Megatrend	(A5)	<i>-comparison between FEDER funds on biodiversity vs investments in roads!</i>
29	Integration of immigrants	Weak signal		
30	Local paradigm	Trend	All	<i>-multi-tiered rural policies</i>
31	Manifestations of new technologies	Trend		
32	Meaning and experience economy	Trend		
33	Micro- and small units	Weak signal	A1	<i>-« légumeries »</i>
34	Migration patterns	Megatrend		
35	Multi-local living	Weak signal		
36	Multifunctional forests	Trend	(A5)	
37	Natural and cultural heritage	Weak signal	A5	
38	New governance models	Weak signal	A3	
39	Pandemics and epidemics	Weak signal	(A1)	
40	Place branding	Weak signal	(A5)	<i>-the geopark label (UNESCO)</i>
41	Policy incidence and effectiveness	Trend	All	
42	Pop-up culture and gig economy	Weak signal		
43	Public goods	Weak signal	A3 A4	<i>-denouncing land and water grabs</i>
44	Remote work	Trend		
45	Resilience	Weak signal	All	
46	Rural artisans	Weak signal		
47	Rural business succession	Trend	A3	
48	Rural energy communities	Weak signal		
49	Rural hubs	Weak signal		
50	Rural in the social media	Trend		
51	Rural lifestyle	Weak signal		
52	Rural tourism	Trend	A5	
53	Search for better quality of life	Weak signal	F-A	
54	Self-sufficiency	Weak signal	A1	
55	Sharing economy	Weak signal		
56	Smart solutions in rural space	Weak signal		
57	Social enterprises and entrepreneurs	Weak signal		
58	Sustainability transition	Megatrend	All	
59	Technology-intensive farming	Trend	A2	
60	Transparency of the food system	Trend	A4	

Main programmes and funds under the multiannual financial framework

All amounts in € billion (2018 prices)

