This longer piece by Rasmus Blædel Larsen is a deep dive into the substance of the initial Green Tripartite Agreement text, as well as into some of the earlier critics of aspects of the agreement. In particular the contentious role of trees, the ambition of the targets, impact on biodiversity and finally actual implementation. Municipalities signed up to this as partners, and have a big role in delivery – perhaps one of the most important roles. But do they have the capacity to follow through?
The stakeholders in The Green Tripartite have announced their vision for the future of Danish agriculture and how it may go hand in hand with reaching Denmark’s climate targets, address biodiversity loss and initiate a massive green transition. But something doesn’t add up according to our correspondent Rasmus Blædel Larsen.
“It was the worst of times, it was the worst of times.” To quote the opening sentence of a recent British prizewinning novel. Those words might very well have been circulating among the Danish farmers earlier this year. Since early spring an avalanche of negative stories have appeared in the press.
Such was the discourse that all of a sudden it seemed plausible that the public mood-swing would force real structural change into the blueprint of The Green Tripartite. The farmers and their lobby organisations were uncharacteristically quiet. So what happened?
Background
A brief recap is perhaps needed. The Danish Climate Law of 2019 stipulates a reduction of the national CO2(equivalents) emission of 70% by 2030. Technological advancements were to be to be central to achieving this. Danish farming however, was already pitching itself as world leaders in climate efficiency, so huge improvements were always going to be a challenge within the current model of production.
And in the years since 2019 more and more experts have indeed called for a structural reform. It seemed inevitable that a reduction in livestock was needed – and thus the current coalition-government, which consists of the Social Democrats (historically behind the environmental regulations, much hated by the farmers), Venstre (The farmer’s party) and Moderaterne (a brand new party, founded by the former PM of Venstre in 2022), announced upon the beginning of their term, that a tax on agricultural emissions would be enforced within this election-term (curiously only on livestock-emissions and not on energy consumption/tilling the soil).
The Climate Change Council (DCCC – an independent body, but established and funded by the government) set to work on a model and presented it on April 27th 2023, the Svarer-commission, consisting mainly of economists, was then tasked with minting out a practical model incorporating the actual measuring and taxing-particularities and is described in an ARC-article in January.
This was – after much delay – presented in the spring of 2024. Only then was The Green Tripartite (TGT) founded, consisting of The Danish Farmers Association, The Nature Conservation Society. The union of workers in the Food-industry, The union of Metal-workers, Danish Industry, the association of Danish municipalities, 5 ministers (Agriculture, Environment, Climate & Supply, Tax and Economy) – and Concito was a so-called ‘knowledge-partner’, there to supply calculations.
The agreement
”Groundbreaking”, ”A radical transformation of the face of Denmark, the like not seen since the agricultural reforms of the 18th century.” The words accompanying the announcement of the agreement reached in the TGT were full of powerful political rhetoric. The subsequent weeks saw the media, experts and just about all corners of the Danish society embrace the agreement with a national pride not seen before in my lifetime. There was dissent, but it was peripheral as the Agricultural minister set out on a tour of the world, which among other places brought him to California, to promote ‘The Danish way’. Only in the first and second week of September did environmental experts begin to dissect the missing links and fundamental flaws in the agreement.
So what’s in it?
The Green Tripartite is a heterogenous, one might say incongruent, piece of text, which rotates between praising farmers and point to the detrimental impacts of various agronomic practices.
On page two we see reference to “healthy” and “good food” and “a still more sustainable, high-tech and landuse-efficient agricultural sector” followed by references to the “decline of both nature-ecosystems and species of animals”.
Central to the agreement is the creation of The Green Area Foundation of Denmark, which will function as an umbrella for:
∙ Subsidies for the planting of 250.000 ha of new forest before 2045
∙ Subsidies for the conservation of 140.000 ha of carbon rich semi-wetlands including peripheral areas before 2030.
∙ Subsidies for general transition, including wetlands and no-tilling landuse.
∙ Strategic land-purchase, with a focus on nitrate-retention and land-redistribution.
A historic high amount of about 40 bio. Kr (6 bio. Euros) will be set aside in The Green Area foundation of Denmark for these initiatives. The money will be allocated on the state fiscal budget – all revenues from taxes are returned to the farmers to advance technological solutions. Furthermore the stakeholders agree that an ambitious transition presupposes a strong local partnership, ownership and a holistic vision. Therefore the municipalities will be given the responsibility of planning and implementing. (page 3)
A bit further down, the first of two carbon-taxes is introduced. “Implementing a CO2(e) tax on emissions from carbon-rich semi-wetlands of 40 kr. pr ton (5 euros/ton ed.), beginning in 2028 (but using 2022 prices). The objective is to give the farmers an incentive to participate in the transition as fast as possible (…) The implementation is expected to reduce CO2 emissions of 0,3 mio tons in 2030 rising to 0,8 mio tons in 2032.” (page 7)
The word ‘incentive’ here is key, it is a voluntary program. The text does include a sentence here and there stating that the framework and timeline behind this tax and other voluntary provisions shall be revisited in 2027 and 2030 respectively to determine their effectiveness.
Trees do the heavy lifting
The most spectacular element of TGT however – and highlighted again and again in press conferences and releases – is the ambition of planting 250.000 ha of new forest – assumedly an increase of 40 % from the current coverage – of which 80.000 are designated ‘untouched’. Conversely 20.000 ha are meant to be recreational city-near park-like landscapes – which the TGT hopes will be 75% financed by the municipalities. (page 10)
The TGT-agreement pins a lot of hope on new technologies (pps 32-39) but especially on the new forest. It will provide habitats for the threatened species, enhance biodiversity, protect drinking water and especially, this is underlined by how many times it is reiterated in the text: function as a nitrate-retention tool. ‘A paradigm-shift in the regulation of nitrate leakage’, it reads on page 16.
The chapter on forest ends however with these sobering words. “The new forest is expected to capture 0,1 mio ton CO2 in 2030 rising to 1,7 mio ton in 2045. The plan presupposes an approval from the state-subsidy-laws of EU.” The last sentence refers to a promise in the agreement, that the farmers can keep their CAP-subsidies even after their land has been turned into forest.(page 9)
The next chapter deals with “Nature and biodiversity.”
Here we have a lot of articulated concern but only vague ideas of how to reverse the decline. The TGT notes that Denmark’s nature is in a very critical state, the words are clear: “The nature in Denmark is under pressure, our animals and plants lack habitats and many species face extinction.” (page 10) Over the course of the next page and a half some alarming facts are listed. But the responsibility for action lies elsewhere. “With the adoption of EUs Nature restoration law, the Government will in 2026 present a comprehensive plan for the restoration of the Danish nature. The national nature restoration plan will describe the need for restoration of the nature on land and in the sea, as well as enhance biodiversity in cities, agriculture and forest; and enhance the diversity of the populations of pollinators”(page 11)
On a positive if slightly ironic note, we now an official document describing a lot of the change needed, but If you condense this chapter into one sentence: we will address nature and biodiversity in our obligatory plan for nature restoration next year, it would capture the essence.
This is clearly what The Nature Conservation Society has been given for their participation. Whether this part of the agreement stands the test of political realities remains to be seen. Already a growing discontent within the society has voiced misgivings. Particular the fact, that the gulf between the 6 bio. put aside and the 20 bio. euros the realization of the plan is expected to cost, well this is the part where TGT finds private stakeholders will have to chip in. In the words of the agreement:
“This will be a big task and the Government will therefore look for other partners in the society, who wishes to contribute – eg the municipalities, private foundations and companies among other. The Government will evaluate the momentum of reaching the target of at least 20% protected nature in 2027” (page 11)
Who’s implementing this? Why it’s the municipalities.
The next chapter is expounding on the organisational set up. Here the municipalities are tasked with, by the end of 2025. creating a transition plan.
“The transition plan is dynamic and must constantly be updated with new knowledge about ongoing projects.(…) and secure that a continuously progress in the municipalities’ work and project-realisations happens parallel with the creation of the transition plan.”
This is perhaps the most critical part of the agreement, at least seen from my biased position: the fact that the municipalities are tasked with implementing the TGT. The Danish municipalities, of which there are 98, have over the past two decades been tasked with more and more of the environmental regulation and control hereof (which previously was done nationally).
At the same time a 2% ‘efficiency-reduction’ in their annual budgets has been enforced. The result is that the municipalities are understaffed and weak when facing strong local interests – especially when lawyers get involved. As of 2024 the Environment-sections of most municipalities are not able to catch up with the workload and losing competent employees, who opt out and get jobs in the private sector. Recruitment – when the local council tries to hire either just someone for a vacancy, or an extra hand to help manage the workload – is increasingly difficult.
Working in a well-to-do municipality myself, I can tell you that the idea, that by the end of the next year a ‘dynamic’ transition plan updated with the latest research has been made, has no connection with reality. But it will allow the government and the farmers to put the blame on the municipalities every time a target is left unreached. A blame-game which unfortunately has become a standard reaction when regulation and farming meets.
It is hard not to suspect that the situation in the municipalities will cause a delay in reaching – and perhaps even abandonment of – targets; and that the parties in the TGT is well aware of this.
At the end of the part of the agreement, which deals with the national implementation and before chapters on international policies and the funding of research into new technologies, it reads: “If the planned reductions are not achieved by 2030, the stakeholders agree, that other similar reductions, amounting to 2,2 mio. tons CO2e must be found within the agricultural sector. It must however be done in a conscientious way, according to principles of the Climate Law, so that the remaining food-production is robust and competitive.” (page 31)
Other Critiques
There is much that isn’t in the agreement. First off, this agreement does not involve reducing livestock; the tax on emissions will not be enforced before 2030-2035 (page 24-29), the revenue from the tax is given back to the farmer’s research institute and it will be so low that it will have no effect on the economy of farmers; large parts of the plan rely on voluntary participation, the state only envisions itself contributing with 6 of the 20 billion euros needed to realize the grand design, there is no correlation between vaguely expressed ideas of a synergy between biodiversity, solar energy parks, groundwater protection, nitrate-retention and the CO2-binding forests in the plan.
Organic farming is not seen as playing any significant part, it is only mentioned in the passing at the end of the agreement.
Curiously the first vocal opponent to the agreement was the former Minister of Business and agricultural spokesperson for the Conservative party, traditionally aligned with the farmers. He – Rasmus Jarlov (C) – said on the 25th of June: “The government sits down with six lobby organisations and calls it a Tripartite. They agree to spend 40 bio. kr of the taxpayers money, which none of them can claim ownership to – that (the ownership to the money ed.) belongs to the parliament.” And, he adds, ”The Danes will pay and the farmers will get away with a much cheaper tax than all the experts recommended.”
Later – after the university’s summer holiday – came the more academic critique.
“The agreement is far from adequate as related to the climate, and it sucks as regards the nature. Had biodiversity been on the agenda, the agreement would have looked completely different.” Carsten Rahbek, Professor of biodiversity, said to the news site science.dk. He further explains that the agreement envisions that 150.000 of the 250.000 ha of forest will be commercially harvested and not produce any biodiversity. “Basically we substitute a wheat-field with a forest-field.”
The professor – in line with many of his peers – also criticizes the pace. “Much of it is partial targets in 2030 and 2040, some of the last of the proposed implementations are set for 2050.”
Whether the government is acknowledging these concerns or not, the appointment of a new Minister for Green Tripartite – Jeppe Bruus (Soc. Dem.) – and his clear an unambiguous statements, in the first interviews, that his primary focus is that the pace of the implementations is high, at least bodes well.
Meanwhile the municipalities are waiting to get information. The council of the municipality where I work adopted the annual budget for 2025-2028 on Monday the 16th of September, with a brief statement saying that they note that the Government has concluded the TGP-agreement and that it stipulates that the municipalities are expected to produce a transition plan by the end of 2025 – but with no information on the content, framework, resources and coordination across administrative borders the council has chosen not to allocate resources.
What’s next
Currently The new Ministry for Green Tripartite is taking form. Civil servants from several other ministries have been and are in the process of being transferred and an expectant anxious confusion is surrounding the work-situation of all involved.
Meanwhile a research report have cast doubt over the baseline for the CO2(e)reductions in TGT and latest the State auditors have disclosed that there isn’t – and has not been for several years – any control of the nitrate-retention measures already in place (which is also a prerequisite for CAP-payments).
Among the uncertainties the unpopularity of the coalition-Government looms; they currently hold a one-vote majority and the agreement will pass through Parliament, but no one expects this government to survive the election next year. How this may impact the crucial first steps of the implementation of the TGT-agreement is unknown. But probably Brussels remain the biggest obstacle. The very last sentence on page 45 reads: ”Many of the concrete initiatives can potentially be viewed as state subsidies, which is why depending on approval of the initiatives by the EU Commission a general disclaimer must be made.” To be continued.
More
Stakeholder Collaboration as the Cornerstone of the Green Transition The Danish Model
Paving the Way for Agriculture Emission Reductions – the Danish case
Missing Targets and Making Partnerships – Denmark and Climate Change
